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III 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of UCA §78a-3(h). 
IV 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in failing 
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to determine what property belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was 
marital property? (Record at page(s) 624) 
Standard of Review: Issues of law are subject to de novo review 
by an appellate court, and the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Blue Cross & 
Blue shield v. State, 779 P.2d 643 (Utah 1989) . 
2. Did the trial court, as a matter of law, and violate 
Mrs. Harris' due process and equal protection rights by imposing 
a time limit on Mrs. Harris' right to provide information and 
documentation to Norman/Loebbecke and Associates (hereinafter, 
"Norman/Loebbecke") with respect to what property was marital 
property and information on the value of the property while the 
court imposed no such limitation on Mr. Harris? (Record at 
page(s) 1283-76) 
Standard of Review: Issues of law are subject to de novo review 
by an appellate court, and the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Blue Cross & 
Blue shield v. State, 779 P.2d 643 (Utah 1989). 
3. Did the trial court err by not including the twenty-
percent equity interest in Aid Equipment, a marital asset, that 
Mr. Harris transferred to his sons after Mr. Harris initiated a 
divorce proceeding against Mrs. Harris, as marital property to 
be properly divided between Mr. and Mrs. Harris in the property 
settlement of their divorce proceeding? (Record at page(s) 365-
366) 
-7-
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of 
review; the legal issues are determined under a correctness 
standard. Anesthesiologist Associates of Qgden vs. St. Benedict 
852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are 
under a marshaling standard, abuse of discretion, Marshall vs. 
Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996); Breinholt vs. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995); Child vs. Child 967 
P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998) . 
4. Did the trial court err by failing to award Mrs. Harris 
her costs, attorney's fees and Norman/Loebbecke fees while 
permitting Mr. Harris .to pay his costs, attorney's fees and 
Norman/Loebbecke fees from the income of Aid Equipment, a 
marital asset? (Record at page(s) 530, 640-641) 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of 
review; the legal issues are determined under a correctness 
standard. Anesthesiologist Associates of Qgden vs. St. Benedict 
852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are 
under a Marshaling Standard, abuse of discretion, Marshall vs. 
Marshall. 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996); Breinholt vs. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995): Child vs. Child 967 
P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998) . 
5. Did the trial court err in not awarding Mrs. Harris 
alimony after an eighteen-year marriage to Mr. Hariris? (Record 
at page(s) 641) 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of 
review; the legal issues are determined under a correctness 
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standard. Anesthesiologist Associates of Ogden vs. St. Benedict, 
852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are 
under a Marshaling Standard, abuse of discretion. Schaumberg 
vs. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994); Child vs. Child, 
967 P.2d 942; (Utah App. 1998); Marshall vs. Marshall, 915 P.2d 
508 (Utah App. 1996); Willev vs. Willev, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 
1993); Rudman vs. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
6. Did the trial court err in finding that Mrs. Harris' 
mother's home, in which she inherited a partial interest and 
which Mrs. Harris was purchasing from her brother and sister was 
marital property? (Record at page(s) 624) 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of 
review; the legal issues are determined under a correctness 
standard. Anesthesiologist Associates of Ogden vs. St. Benedict 
852 P.2d 103 0 (Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are 
under a marshaling standard of abuse of discretion. Phillips 
vs. Hatfield 904 P.2d 1108 (Utah App. 1995); Marshall vs. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996); Five vs. Fife, 77 P.2d 
512 (Utah App. 1989). 
7. Did the trial court err by requiring Mrs. Harris to pay 
one-half of the Norman/Loebbecke fees associated with the 
divorce proceeding? (Record at page(s) 1283) 
Standard of Review: These issues are a mixed standard of 
review; the legal issues are determined under a correctness 
standard. Anesthesiologist Associates of Ogden vs. St. Benedict 
852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1993). The factual determinations are 
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under a marshaling standard, abuse of discretion, Marshall vs. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996); Breinholt vs. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995); Child vs. Child 967 
P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998) . 
8. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in failing 
to determine whether or not Mr. Harris had an interest in CST 
and to include that interest as a marital asset to be divided 
between Mr. and Mrs. Harris in their divorce proceeding? 
(Record at page(s) 1281: 589) 
Standard of Review: Issues of law are subject to de novo review 
by an appellate court, and the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Blue Cross & 
Blue shield v. State, 779 P.2d 643 (Utah 1989). 
V 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Reproduced in Addendum 
VI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Supplementary of Divorce entered 
on November 29, 1999, Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, entered on November 29, 1999, the 
Supplementary Decree of Divorce Re: Rule 59 Motion, entered 
February 21, 2 0 01, and the Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Re: Respondent's Rule 59 Motion, entered 
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February 21, 2001 between Bonnie Kay Harris (hereinafter, "Mrs. 
Harris")and Craig Jack Harris (hereinafter, uMr. Harris"), 
dividing their marital assets between them and allocating costs 
and fees associated with the divorce proceeding between them. 
B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Mr. Harris filed a petition for divorce against Mrs. Harris 
on September 20, 1995. The case was later bifurcated and, upon 
stipulation of the parties, a Decree of Divorce was entered 
between Mr. and Mrs. Harris on January 26, 1999; the division of 
the marital estate reserved for trial. Trial was held on August 
16-17, 1999, September 23, 1999, with a final hearing held on 
October 12, 1999. A hearing on Mrs. Harris' Rule 59 Motion, was 
held February 13, 2001. 
C 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both parties had been previously married before their 
marriage to each other on November 7, 1982 and each of them 
brought separate assets into their marriage. (Record at page(s) 
45) 
Prior to their marriage, among other things, Mr. Harris 
owned interest in a company call Aid Equipment, which he had 
started several years before his marriage to Mrs. Harris. 
(Record at page(s) 51). Mr. Harris owned additional 
miscellaneous personal property, which the trial court valued at 
$141,800.00, including the value of Aid Equipment and $60,000.00 
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Investment in the stock at the time Mr. and Mrs. Harris married. 
(Record at page(s) 630) 
The trial court found that Mrs. Harris brought in premarital 
assets of cash in addition to personal property consisting of 
furniture and other miscellaneous items, which the trial court 
valued at approximately $96,500.00 plus an undetermined amount 
for her retirement from Signetics, her place of employment at 
the time of her marriage to Mr. Harris. (Record at page(s) 10). 
Prior to the parties' marriage, Mrs. Harris had been working at 
Signetics and she continued to work at Signetics on a full time 
basis until the company was closed in 1992. (Record at page(s) 
10). The trial court ordered division of the Signetics 
retirement pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1982). (Record at page(s) 629) 
After Signetics closed, Mrs. Harris attended college for 
about two years, but she did not work after her layoff from 
Signetics. (Record at page(s) 38, 139). Mrs. Harris did not 
work after her termination from Signetics partially because she 
was suffering from congestive heart failure and partially 
because she and Mr. Harris felt that Mrs. Harris needed to be at 
home to take care of her grandson. (Record at page(s) 87, 267) 
By mutual agreement with Mr. Harris, Mrs. Harris stayed home 
and took care of her grandson, Colby Sorensen, who Mr. Harris 
considered, and still considers his own grandson, although they 
are not blood related. (Record at page(s) 87). During this 
time, Mrs. Harris also assisted Mr. Harris with the operation of 
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the business Aid Equipment. (Record at page(s) 83-84). During 
their marriage, Mrs. Harris invested forty-three thousand 
dollars ($43,000.00) of her own money in Aid Equipment. (Record 
at page(s)(s) 47-48). These funds were her sole and separate 
property that she brought into the marriage. (Record at page(s) 
46-47) 
Prior to their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Harris lived in an 
apartment for about a year during 1981. Subsequently, Mr. 
Harris' ex-wife (Inger Harris) contacted him and requested that 
he take custody of their two sons, Scott Harris, age six, and 
Troy Harris, age eight. Mr. Harris and his ex-wife agreed that 
Mr. Harris could move back into their home, that was awarded to 
her in their divorce, if he and Mrs. Harris would take custody 
of Mr. Harris' two sons. Mr. Harris and Mrs. Harris moved back 
into Mr. Harris' marital home in Pleasant Grove, and Mr. Harris 
agreed to pay Inger Harris, his ex-wife, $20,000.00, 
representing her one-half interest in the marital home. (Record 
at page(s) 8-9) 
After their marriage in 1982, Mr. and Mrs. Harris acquired 
several parcels of real property, including two building lots 
adjacent to the home located in Pleasant Grove, and Mr. Harris 
purchased a commercial parcel of property consisting of a home 
and a vacant lot in Salt Lake County. (Record at page(s) 36). 
Later, Mr. Harris constructed a building on the commercial 
property and began operating Aid Equipment from that location. 
(Record at page(s) 80) 
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After the parties were married, Mrs. Harris gave Mr. Harris 
two loans to be used for Aid Equipment. The loans that totaled 
approximately $23,000.00 were made during December, 1982 and 
January, 1983 from Mrs. Harris' separate money that she had 
brought into the marriage. (Record at page(s) 47). Mr. Harris 
never paid back the loans to Mrs. Harris and she testified at 
trial that she considered the money as her investment in the 
business and an investment in their marriage. The money was 
used to pay the mortgage on the Aid Equipment property. (Record 
at page(s) 47) 
In February, 1990, Mrs. Harris paid $20,000.00 she had 
received as a gift from her mother to the Bank of American Fork 
on a business debt for the benefit of Mr. Harris and Aid 
Equipment. (Record at page(s) 116) 
After her mother's death, and in May, 1993, Mrs. Harris 
purchased her mother's home from her brother and sister, which 
they had jointly received from their mother's estate. (Record 
at page(s) 49-50) 
After the parties separation in early 1995, and after the 
filing of the divorce action, Mrs. Harris resided in the marital 
home and has continued to live in the Pleasant Grove residence. 
(Record at page(s) 8-9) 
Mr. Harris filed for divorce against Mrs. Harris September 
20, 1995. (Record at page(s) 2). During the parties' marriage, 
the parties further acquired numerous items of personal 
property, and traveled extensively both on business and personal 
-14-
trips, particularly after Mrs. Harris's employment with 
Signetics ended in 1992. (Record at page(s) 39, 161) 
After the Petition for Divorce was filed, the parties 
continued to have intimate relations with each other, continued 
to see each other on consistent basis, and continued to travel 
extensively with each other. (Record at page(s) 1768-180, 144-
145, 237-238) 
After their separation in 1995, Mr. Harris transferred 20% 
of AID Equipment to his sons, Troy Harris and Scot Harris. This 
transfer was made without any consideration of any nature 
whatsoever received from the appellant's sons. (Record at 
page(s) 520) Scot Harris specifically testified that he paid 
nothing for the interest in Aid Equipment he received from his 
father. (Record at page(s) 1279: 342) 
By Stipulation of the parties, Norman/Loebbecke and 
Associates (hereinafter, "Norman/Loebbecke") of Salt Lake City, 
was appointed to do an evaluation of the marital assets of Mr. 
and Mrs. Harris. (Record at page(s) 270-273). 
Norman/Loebbecke, was to perform the evaluation from information 
provided to them by the parties. Norman/Loebbecke subsequently 
issued a report that listed Mr. and Mrs. Harris7 marital assets 
and liabilities and the values of the various assets. Based on 
this information, the court found that the net value of Mr. and 
Mrs. Harris' marital estate was $975,273.00. (Record at page(s) 
629) 
The Court used the net value after taxes as found by Brad 
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Townsend of Norman/Loebbecke in making its property 
distribution. The Court incorporated a Schedule A, Proposed 
Marital Asset and Liability Distribution, "as per Craig Harris", 
prepared by Norman/Loebbecke into its Supplementary Findings of 
Fact and Supplementary Decree of Divorce when making its 
property distribution. (Record at page(s) 624) 
Mr. Harris paid Norman/Loebbecke's fees prior to the trial 
as well as his personal attorney's fees out of Aid Equipment 
funds. (Record at page(s) 58). Mrs. Harris received no award 
of attorney's fees or costs in this matter. (Record at page(s) 
628). Each party was ordered to pay their own attorney's fees 
and was each ordered to pay one-half of Norman/Loebbecke' s fees. 
However, Mr. Harris used Aid Equipment, a marital asset, to pay 
his costs and attorney's fees while Mrs. Harris was required to 
sell assets she received in the divorce proceeding to pay her 
costs and attorney's fees. (Record at page(s) 626-627) 
During the divorce proceeding Mrs. Harris was ordered to 
provide Norman/Loebbecke with all information she wished the 
firm to consider in preparing the valuation of assets by October 
29, 1999. (Record at page(s) 359-360). Mrs. Harris timely 
provided all such information to her then attorney, Margo 
Hiller-Ploster, but Mrs. Hiller-Polster failed to timely give 
the information to Norman/Loebbecke. Therefore, the trial court 
refused to permit Norman/Loebbecke to consider any of the 
information provided by Mrs. Harris. (Record at page(s) 494-
500). The appellant, however was under no such restriction, and 
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he continued to provide Norman/Loebbecke with unlimited and 
unrestricted information even after the trial. (Record at 
page(s) 1283-78) 
Mrs. Harris was ordered to pay attorney's fees to the 
appellant regarding an Order to Show Cause held in October, 
1998. (Record at page(s) 359). Mrs. Harris was ordered to pay 
attorneys fees due to her former attorney's (Margo Hiller-
Ploster's) failure to provide information to Norman/Loebbecke in 
a timely manner. (The information was provided one day late). 
(Record at page(s) 359-360). Additionally, Mrs. Harris was 
further ordered to pay all Norman/Loebbecke fees related to her 
failure to comply with the Court's Order on an Order to Show 
Cause related to the hearing. Furthermore, Mrs. Harris was 
required to pay one-half of the Norman/Loebbecke fees associated 
with the review of documents, examination of material and 
preparation of irrelevant schedules, preparation of settlement 
offers for Mr. Harris, affidavits for and by Mr. Harris and his 
counsel, proposals from Mr. Harris, schedules prepared at the 
request of Mr. Harris, as well as the cost of consultations of 
Mr. Harris and his counsel with Norman/Loebbecke, after Mrs. 
Harris was precluded from providing any information to 
Norman/Loebbecke. (Record at page(s) 1283: 117-123). The trial 
court only imposed a cut-off of information on Mrs. Harris, not 
Mr. Harris. (Record at page(s) 1283: 117-123). The trial court 
later gave Mrs. Harris an additional ten days to submit 
documentation to Norman/Loebbecke. However, Mr. Harris 
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:ontinued to have the unrestricted and unfettered right to give 
anything to Norman/Loebbecke, even post trial. (Record at 
page(s) 1283: 78) 
The trial court granted Mrs. Harris7 Rule 59 Motion seeking 
relief from the court's order requiring her to pay one-half of 
the Norman/Loebbecke fees, but then at a hearing held on 
February 13, 2001 on the Rule 59 Motion, ruled that the court's 
prior order requiring Mrs. Harris to pay one-half of the 
Norman/Loebbecke fees would stand. (Record at page(s) 1283: 122-
123) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court erred and committed reversible and 
prejudicial error when it failed to determine what property 
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was marital property. The 
trial court improperly and unlawfully permitted Brad Townsend of 
Norman/Loebbecke to make the determination as to what property 
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was or was not marital property 
as well as making the determination as to who actually owned the 
property. Under Utah law, the trial court has the 
responsibility to determine what is marital property. It cannot 
abdicate that responsibility. 
POINT II 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
and violated Mrs. Harris7 constitutional due process and equal 
-18-
protection rights when it precluded Mrs. Harris from providing 
Norman/Loebbecke with evidence on the ownership, existence and 
value of marital property, but permitted Mr. Harris to have the 
unrestricted and unlimited right to have Norman/Loebbecke 
review, examine or do anything he requested of them, even post 
trial. 
POINT III 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
when it failed and refused to include the twenty-percent equity 
interest in Aid Equipment that Mr. Harris transferred to his 
sons, without receipt of any consideration whatsoever, after Mr. 
Harris had initiated this divorce proceeding against Mrs. 
Harris. The trial court determined that Aid Equipment was a 
marital asset to be divided between Mr. and Mrs Harris, but 
nonetheless failed to include the twenty percent ownership 
interest in Aid Equipment unlawfully transferred by Mr. Harris 
to his sons in its property division between Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris. 
POINT IV 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
when it permitted Mr. Harris to pay his attorney's fees and 
Norman/Loebbecke fees from the income of Aid Equipment, a 
marital asset, while requiring Mrs. Harris to pay her attorney's 
fees and Norman/Loebbecke fees from her share of the property 
settlement. 
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POINT V 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
when it failed to award Mrs. Harris alimony after an eighteen-
year marriage to Mr. Harris. Furthermore, the trial court 
committed reversible and prejudicial error by failing to make 
specific and sufficient findings in its decision not to award 
Mrs. Harris alimony after her eighteen-year marriage to Mr. 
Harris. 
POINT VI 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
in finding that Mrs. Harris' interest in her mother's home, 
which Mrs. Harris had inherited and was purchasing from her 
brother and sister, was marital property to be distributed 
between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. 
POINT VII 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
by requiring Mrs. Harris to pay one-half of the Norman/Loebbecke 
fees associated with the divorce proceeding, when the vast 
majority of the "work" performed by Norman/Loebbecke was 
performed at the request of Mr. Harris, for his sole benefit, 
was beyond the scope of Norman/Loebbecke's authorization to 
perform, and nothing whatsoever to do with evaluation of marital 
assets. 
POINT VIII 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing 
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determine whether or not Mr. Harris had any interest in CST and 
to include Mr. Harris' interest in CST as a marital asset to be 
divided between Mr. and Mrs. Harris in their divorce proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO DETERMINE 
WHICH ASSETS OF MR. AND MRS. HARRIS WERE IN FACT MARITAL ASSETS 
AND FAILING TO INCLUDE THOSE ASSETS IN THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION. 
In making his property distribution between Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris, the trial court simply accepted the determination of 
Norman/Loebbecke as to what constituted marital property between 
Mr. and Mrs. Harris. Norman/Loebbecke made this determination 
based on the desires of Mr. Harris (Record at page(s) (s) 624) . 
Likewise, the trial court simply accepted Mr. Harris' assertions 
as to the value of the various items of property in making his 
property distribution. (Record at page(s) 624) 
Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order permitting 
Norman/Loebbecke to determine the value of marital assets in 
this case, Norman/Loebbecke was only to determine the value any 
property claimed to be marital property. The trial court was to 
determine what property was marital property if Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris could not agree as to what was and was not marital 
property, and the trial court was to make the final 
determination of the value of the property if the parties could 
not agree on value. The trial court was required to make a 
determination if any property was marital property. 
-21-
Jorman/Loebbecke did not have that authority. (Record at page(s) 
110) . 
Mrs. Harris provided Norman/Loebbecke with substantial and 
irrefutable evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Harris had substantially 
nore marital property that was being claimed by Mr. Harris. 
VIrs. Harris provided Norman/Loebbecke with titles, verified 
affidavits and pictures evidencing additional property that 
should be considered as marital property. However, 
Norman/Loebbecke acting on behalf of Mr. Harris refused to 
consider the property as marital property and failed and refused 
to include it on the schedule of assets to be distributed 
between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. (Record at page(s) 43 3) 
The trial court was presented with the information regarding 
additional assets, nonetheless, the trial court failed to 
consider any of this evidence and failed to include the 
additional items in the property distribution between Mr. and 
Mrs. Harris. The trial court simply accepted the 
Norman/Loebbecke/Mr. Harris position on what was marital 
property. (Record at page(s) 148-157, 176-179) 
The trial court is required, as a matter of law, to 
determine what property belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was 
marital. See: Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The trial court cannot abdicate that responsibility to another 
and cannot simply accept the position of one party to the 
divorce with respect to what constitutes marital property. 
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The trial court is also required to consider all marital 
property when making a property distribution. Marital property 
is all property acquired during marriage except property 
acquired by gift or inheritance, and it encompasses all of the 
assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived. See: Dunn v. Dunn, 
802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), quoting Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)). 
Because the trial court did not make any determination 
concerning which assets of Mr. and Mrs. Harris were marital 
property, it committed prejudicial and reversible error. As a 
direct and proximate result of the trial court's failure to make 
a proper determination of what property owned by Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris constituted marital property, Mrs. Harris was denied her 
fair, equitable and legal interest in marital property that was 
improperly and unlawfully excluded from the property 
distribution award. Therefore, Mrs. Harris is entitled to have 
"Norman/Loebbecke" determination of marital assets reversed and 
have the trial court make a determination as to which assets of 
Mr. and Mrs. Harris are marital assets. Mrs. Harris is also 
entitled to have an order entered awarding her fair, equitable 
and legal share of the omitted marital property. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND VIOLATED MRS-
HARRIS' DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY IMPOSING A 
TIME LIMIT ON MRS. HARRIS' RIGHT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND 
DOCUMENTATION TO NORMAN/LOEBBECKE WITH RESPECT TO WHICH 
ASSETS WERE MARITAL ASSETS AND INFORMATION ON THE VALUE OF 
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HOSE ASSETS WHILE THE COURT IMPOSED NO SUCH LIMITATION ON MR. 
IARRIS. 
Pursuant to the trial court order dated, 1/26/1998, Mrs. 
larris was required to deliver to Norman/Loebbecke all documents 
md evidence which Mrs. Harris wanted Norman/Loebbecke to 
:onsider in making its determination as to the value of Mr. and 
4rs. Harris marital assets. Mrs. Harris provided all of the 
lecessary information and documentation to her counsel, Margo 
liller-Polster on 10/27/1999. (Record at page(s) 494-500). 
iowever, Mrs. Hiller-Polster failed to timely provide the 
information and documentation to Norman/Loebbecke in the time 
mandated by the court's March 22, 1999 order. Therefore, Mrs. 
Harris was precluded from presenting any evidence to 
Norman/Loebbecke with respect to what property of Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris was in fact marital property and any information with 
respect to the value to any property that was considered as 
marital property. (Record at page(s) 624) 
This restriction was only imposed on Mrs. Harris and Mr. 
Harris was permitted to continue to submit evidence and 
documentation concerning the marital property to 
Norman/Loebbecke the entire time of divorce proceeding, 
including after the trial had been concluded. (Record at page(s) 
1283-76). To add insult to injury, Mrs. Harris was also required 
to pay one-half of the fees charged by Norman/Loebbecke to 
evaluate documents and evidence, prepare affidavits, schedules, 
settlement proposals, and assist Mr. Harris and his counsel in 
preparation for trial, and post-trial proceedings, during a time 
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when she herself was precluded from presenting any evidence of a 
nature whatsoever to Norman/Loebbecke. (Record at page(s) 12 83-
76) 
It is a per se violation of Mrs. Harris' due process rights 
as well as her equal protection rights to permit Mr. Harris to 
have an unlimited right to provide Norman/Loebbecke with 
whatever evidence or documents he wishes and at the same time 
preclude Mrs. Harris from providing any evidence or documents of 
any nature whatsoever to Norman/Loebbecke because Mrs. Harris7 
former counsel Margo Hiller-Polster failed to timely provide 
that information to Norman/Loebbecke even though Mrs. Harris 
timely provided such information and evidence to Mrs. Hiller-
Polster. The trial court cannot lawfully permit Mr. Harris to 
have the unlimited and unrestricted right to provide anything he 
wants to Norman/Loebbecke for consideration as to the existence 
and value of marital property and at the same time, preclude 
Mrs. Harris from providing Norman/Loebbecke with any evidence 
proving the existence and value of marital assets. Yet, this is 
what the trial court did. 
By limiting Mrs. Harris' right to provide evidence 
concerning the existence and value of marital property to 
Norman/Loebbecke, while permitting Mr. Harris to have the 
unrestricted and unlimited right to provide Norman/Loebbecke 
with whatever information he chose, the trial court violated 
Mrs. Harris' due process and equal protection rights. This 
depravation of Mrs. Harris' constitutional rights coupled with 
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he trial court's failure to determine what property of Mr. and 
Irs. Harris was actually marital property has resulted in damage 
.o Mrs. Harris and constitutes prejudicial and reversible error 
)n the part of the trial court. As a direct and proximate 
result of the trial court's error, Mrs. Harris has been denied 
ler legal right to present evidence concerning the existence and 
ralue of marital property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Harris. The 
:rial court's actions constitute prejudicial and reversible 
Brror. Therefore, this part of the Decree of Divorce should be 
reversed and Mrs. Harris should be permitted to present all 
evidence she has or can obtain regarding the existence and value 
of martial property. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT INCLUDING THE 
TWENTY-PERCENT EQUITY INTEREST IN AID EQUIPMENT TRANSFERRED BY 
MR. HARRIS TO HIS SONS, WITHOUT RECEIPT OF ANY CONSIDERATION 
WHATSOEVER, AS MARITAL PROPERTY AND PROPERLY AND TO DIVIDE 
THAT TWENTY PERCENT INTEREST BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. HARRIS IN THE 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT. 
It is indisputable that Aid Equipment is/was a marital asset 
of Mr. and Mrs. Harris. Mrs. Harris payed $2 0,000.00 on the 
mortgage of Aid Equipment (Record at page 1280: 116-118), and 
she invested another $23,000.00 in Aid Equipment. (Record at 
page(s) 1280-102-103). Mrs. Harris also worked at Aid Equipment 
subsequent to her termination from Signetics. (Record at 
page(s)1280-82). 
It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Harris' transferred 20% of 
Aid Equipment to his sons after he had initiated divorce 
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proceedings against Mr. Harris. (Record at page(s) (s) 1274: 
366). And it is also an undisputed fact that Mr. Harris' 
transfer of twenty percent (20%)of the ownership in Aid 
Equipment to his sons resulted in a loss to Mrs. Harris of 10 
percent of the value of Aid Equipment, which she should have 
been awarded in the property distribution between Mr. Harris and 
herself. It is also undisputed that Troy and Scot Harris paid 
nothing whatsoever for the 2 0% of Aid Equipment transferred to 
them. (Record at page(s) 1279: 342) 
Although a party to a divorce proceeding is not strictly 
prohibited from disposing of assets during the pendency of a 
proceeding, any disposal of marital assets that dissipate 
marital assets are prohibited. See Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 
P.2d 835, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Anderson v Anderson, 757 
P.2d 476, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In the instant action, Mr. 
Harris had no legal right to transfer a portion of Aid 
Equipment, a marital asset, to his sons after he had filed a 
divorce proceeding against Mrs. Harris. That transfer was a 
dissipation of a marital asset, i.e, Aid Equipment and was 
prohibited under the standards of Jefferies v. Jefferies and 
Anderson v Anderson. 
Mr. Harris transferred twenty percent (20%) of Aid Equipment 
to his sons without receiving any compensation of any nature 
whatsoever. (Record at page(s) 520). He did so to deprive Mrs. 
Harris of her lawful share of Aid Equipment, a marital asset, 
and his actions constituted dissipation of marital assets in 
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violation of Utah law. See Jefferies v. Jefferies and Anderson 
T Anderson, supra. 
As previously set forth in this brief, a trial court is 
required to consider all marital property when making a property 
listribution. Marital property is all property acquired during 
narriage except property acquired by gift or inheritance, and it 
encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived. 
5ee: Dunn v. Dunn, Gardner v. Gardner, supra. Because the 
trial court determined that Aid Equipment was a marital asset, 
it is required to consider all of Aid Equipment in making a 
property distribution between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. The trial 
court could not lawfully find that only 8 0% of Aid Equipment was 
a marital asset and permit Mr. Harris to dissipate the value of 
Aid Equipment during the divorce proceeding by transferring 2 0% 
of the value of Aid Equipment to his sons. 
Because Mr. Harris unlawfully transferred twenty percent 
(20%) of the ownership of Aid Equipment, a marital asset, to his 
sons after he had initiated divorce proceedings against Mrs. 
Harris, Mrs. Harris has been deprived of her rightful and legal 
interest to 10 percent (10% of Aid Equipment, or 10 percent 
(10%)) of the value of Aid Equipment, unlawfully transferred to 
Mr. Harris' sons. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law when it awarded Mrs. Harris only one-half (M) of the 
value of 80% of Aid Equipment, i.e., 40% of the value of Aid 
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Equipment rather than 50% of the value to which she is lawfully 
entitled. That error was prejudicial and reversible. 
Consequently, this Court must reverse this portion of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce and remand this case to the trial 
court with instructions to award to Mrs. Harris an additional 
ten percent (10%) of the value of Aid Equipment. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO AWARD 
MRS. HARRIS HER COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES WHILE PERMITTING MR. 
HARRIS TO PAY HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM THE INCOME OF 
AID EQUIPMENT, A MARITAL ASSET. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, it is an indisputable 
fact that Aid Equipment is a marital asset in this divorce 
proceeding. It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Harris paid both 
his attorney's fees and his Norman/Loebbecke fees from the 
revenues generated by Aid Equipment, a marital asset. (Record at 
page(s) 581) 
In the instant matter, the trial court failed to make any 
findings with regard to Mrs. Harris' ability to pay her 
attorney's fees and Norman/Loebbecke fees assessed against her. 
(Record at page(s) 783). However, at the same time, the trial 
court permitted Mr. Harris to pay his attorney's fees and his 
assessment of the Norman/Loebbecke fees from the income 
generated by Aid Equipment, a marital asset. 
It is undisputed that during the pendency of this divorce 
and for some time prior to the divorce proceeding, it was agreed 
between Mr. and Mrs. Harris, that Mrs. Harris would remain at 
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Lome attending and caring for Colby Sorensen, Mrs. Harris' her 
jrandson, who Mr. Harris considered and still considers his 
jrandson. Also, by mutual agreement Mrs. Harris would remain 
lome and assist Mr. Harris with the operation of Aid Equipment, 
\rtien necessary. 
It is an additional undisputed fact that during the pendency 
}f this divorce proceeding Mrs. Harris' income was limited to 
:he minimal support payments she received pursuant to the trial 
courts' separation order and some small amount of money left 
Dver from the money she received from the rental of her mother's 
aome that she was purchasing from her brother and sister with 
the money received from the rental of the property. Therefore, 
VIrs. Harris had no funds available from which she could pay her 
attorney fees and that portion of the Norman/Loebbecke fees 
assessed against her. 
Mr. Harris on-the-other-hand, had both his income from Aid 
Equipment, the revenue from Aid Equipment with which to pay his 
attorney fees and the Norman/Loebbecke fees. Mr. Harris had 
sole and complete control of the revenue generated by Aid 
Equipment, a marital asset, and he used that income to pay his 
legal fees and his portion of the Norman/Loebbecke fees assessed 
against him. 
Both the law and equity demand that Mrs. Harris be treated 
equally to Mr. Harris. Aid Equipment was marital property 
during the divorce proceeding between Mr. and Mrs Harris. Aid 
Equipment was as much Mrs. Harris' property as it was Mr. 
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Harris' property. Therefore, Mrs. Harris is as equally entitled 
to have her attorney fees and her portion of the 
Norman/Loebbecke fees paid by Aid Equipment as was Mr. Harris. 
The trial court cannot lawfully permit Mr. Harris to use Aid 
Equipment, the sole income producing marital asset in the 
marriage, for his personal benefit and to permit him to pay his 
costs and attorney's fees associated with the divorce proceeding 
with the revenue generated by Aid Equipment and then require 
Mrs. Harris to sell the property she received in the property 
settlement to pay her costs, attorney's fees and 
Norman/Loebbecke fees. 
The overriding consideration in property division is that 
the ultimate division be equitable. See: Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),(quoting Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)). By permitting Mr. 
Harris to pay his attorney's fees and his share of the 
Norman/Loebbecke fees from the revenue of Aid Equipment, while 
requiring Mrs. Harris to pay her attorney's fees and her share 
of the Norman/Loebbecke fees from the sale of property she 
received in the property distribution, the trial court violated 
the fundamental principal of property distribution stated in 
Burt v. Burt and Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. The effect of the trial 
court permitting Mr. Harris to pay his attorney's fees and his 
share of the Norman/Loebbecke fees from the revenue of Aid 
Equipment is that he received at least $58,705.24 more from the 
property distribution than did Mrs. Harris, i.e., the amount of 
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r. Harris attorney's fees and her share of the Norman/Loebbecke 
ees which were paid by Aid Equipment, a marital asset. 
As a direct proximate result of the trial court permitting 
lr. Harris to pay his attorney's fees and Norman/Loe^bbecke fees 
:rom Aid Equipment, a marital asset, while requiring Mrs. Harris 
:o pay her attorney fees and her portion of the Norman/Loebbecke 
:ees from monies generated by selling the assets she received in 
;he property distribution Mrs. Harris has been inequitably, 
mfairly and unlawfully treated. By permitting Mr. Harris to 
Day his attorney's fees and costs from the income of Aid 
equipment, Mr. Harris in effect received $58,705.25 more in the 
property settlement than did Mrs. Harris. 
Because Aid Equipment was a marital asset, and because the 
:rial court permitted Mr. Harris to pay his attorney's fees and 
lis portion of the Norman/Loebbecke fees from Aid Equipment, the 
:rial court erred as a matter of law in not treating Mrs. Harris 
In a like manner to Mr. Harris and not requiring that her 
attorney's fees and her share of the Norman/Loebbecke fees paid 
by Aid Equipment. That error was prejudicial and reversible, 
and, therefore, this Court must enter an order reversing and 
remanding that portion of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce to 
the trial court with instructions to treat Mrs. Harris in the 
same manner as Mr. Harris with respect to payment of attorney's 
fees and Norman/Loebbecke fees, and enter an order directing 
that her attorney's fees and Norman/Loebbecke fees be paid by 
Aid Equipment. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT AWARDING MRS- HARRIS ALIMONY 
AFTER AN EIGHTEEN-YEAR MARRIAGE TO MR. HARRIS. 
The p u r p o s e of an a l i m o n y award i s t o e n a b l e t h e r e c e i v i n g 
s p o u s e t o m a i n t a i n , a s n e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e , t h e s t a n d a r d of 
l i v i n g e n j o y e d d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e . See Noble v . N o b l e , 761 
P . 2 d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) ; Howell v . Howel l , 806 P . 2 d 1209, 
1212 (Utah C t . App. 1 9 9 1 ) , c e r t , denied, 817 P . 2 d 327 (Utah 
1991) . 
I n 1995 , UCA §3 0 - 3 - 5 was amended t o p r o v i d e t h a t t h e 
s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g s h o u l d be e v a l u a t e d a s of t h e t i m e of 
s e p a r a t i o n . However, t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s d i s c r e t i o n t o u s e t h e 
s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l . <( Courts are to look to the standard 
of living existing at or near the time of trial in determining alimony. " Howell v . Howel l , 
s u p r a ; Hoacrland v . H o a a l a n d . 852 P .2d 1025 (Utah C t . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . 
"That is consistent with the goal of equalizing the parties 'post divorce status. It is further 
justified because any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change 
of circumstances has occurred.}y B r i d e n b a u g h v . B r i d e n b a u g h , 786 P . 2 d 2 4 1 , 
242 (Utah C t . App. 1 9 9 0 ) . 
S t a n d a r d of l i v i n g i s d e f i n e d a s a minimum of n e c e s s i t i e s , 
c o m f o r t s , o r l u x u r i e s t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l t o m a i n t a i n a p e r s o n i n 
h i s o r h e r c u s t o m a r y o r p r o p e r s t a t u s o r c i r c u m s t a n c e . (WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2223). "An a l i m o n y award s h o u l d , 
t o t h e e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , e q u a l i z e t h e p a r t i e s ' r e s p e c t i v e p o s t -
d i v o r c e l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s . . . . See , Rasband v . Rasband , 752 
P . 2 d 1 3 3 1 , 1333 (Utah C t . App. 1 9 8 0 ) . 
UCA § 3 0 - 3 - 5 ( 7 ) (d) p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e c o u r t may a t t e m p t t o 
-33-
equalize the parties' standard of living. This codified a line 
>f cases providing that alimony should attempt to put the 
>arties on an equal footing financially. See, e.g., Godfrey v. 
Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). An alimony award 
should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective 
)ost-divorce living standards and maintain them at a level as 
:lose as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
aarriage (at the time of separation). See, Gardner v. Gardner, 
supra. While exact equality of income is not required a 
sufficient award is necessary to allow both parties to be on 
Bqual footing financially after the divorce. See, Howell v. 
lowell supra. 
In making a decision on alimony the trial court must 
consider the following factors: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient s earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(Hi) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
The trial court must first determine the financial needs and 
resources for both parties. Second, the court should set 
alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the 
parties' standard of living during the marriage as closely as 
possible. See Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 
1991); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978). 
If the payor spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need 
not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but. should also 
consider the recipient spouse's station in life. See, Howell v. 
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Howell, supra; (quoting Gramme v. Gramme, supra. The trial 
court must also consider all sources of income that were used by 
the parties during their marriage to meet their self-defined 
needs, when awarding alimony, from whatever source—overtime, 
second job, self-employment, etc., as well as unearned income. 
See Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
In the instant matter, the trial court indicated that it had 
considered the items specified in UCA §30-3-5(7), (Record at 
page(s) 630), however, it made no specific findings regarding 
its alleged consideration of those items. The trial court 
instructed J. Grant Moody to prepare appropriate findings with 
respect the specified items the court's consideration of the 
various items; however, the court did not articulate any 
findings from which Mr. Moody could prepare specific findings 
relevant to the various items. Therefore, Mr. Moody was unable 
to prepare any specific findings and could only prepare Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law indicating that the trial court 
considered the items specified in UCA 30-3-5(7). (Record at 
page(s)63 0). 
In this case, Mrs. Harris was married to Mr. Harris for 
nearly eighteen-years. During their marriage Mrs. Harris worked 
until approximately December 18, 1992, when Signetics, the 
company for which she was working, closed its Orem office. 
(Record at page(s) 139). Thereafter, it was agreed between Mr. 
and Mrs. Harris, that Mrs. Harris would remain at home attending 
and caring for Colby Sorensen, Mrs. Harris7 her grandson, who 
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Ir. Harris still considers his grandson, and assist Mr. Harris 
/ith the operation of Aid Equipment. 
Subsequent to Mrs. Harris7 termination from Signetics she in 
:act remained at home attending and caring for Colby Sorensen 
md assisting Mr. Harris with the operation of Aid Equipment. 
(Record at page(s)87, 267). It is an additional undisputed fact 
:hat during the pendency of this divorce proceeding Mrs. Harris' 
Income was limited to the minimal support payments she received 
pursuant to the trial court's separation agreement and some 
small amount of money left over from the money she received from 
-he rental of her mother's home that she was purchasing from her 
Drother and sister, with the money received from the rental of 
that property. And it is a further undisputed fact that 
subsequent to her termination from Signetics, and continuing 
through the majority of the divorce proceeding, Mrs. Harris was 
suffering from congestive heart failure. (Record at page(s) 
267). Additionally, since the divorce proceeding, Mrs. Harris 
has suffered a heart attack. Mrs. Harris was 56 years old at 
the time of the divorce. By agreement with Mr. Harris, she had 
not worked for seven years, other than in the home and at Aid 
Equipment. 
For seven years after her termination from Signetics, Mrs. 
Harris depended on the revenue from Aid Equipment to support 
her. Aid Equipment was, after all, a marital asset in which 
Mrs. Harris had invested $43,000.00 of her own separate money. 
Aid Equipment was the only revenue-producing asset Mr. and Mrs. 
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Harris jointly owned, and Mr. Harris was awarded Aid Equipment 
in the property settlement of the divorce proceeding. Aid 
Equipment was valued by the trial court at $450,000.00. 
However, Aid Equipment was a revenue generating asset. Mr. 
Harris not only used Aid Equipment to support himself, he used 
it to support his children. (Record at page(s)1279: 331-332). 
Mr. Harris was not required to sell Aid Equipment in order 
to support himself because he was awarded Aid Equipment with its 
revenue stream, and that income stream was not cut off during 
the divorce proceeding because he solely controlled the revenue 
of Aid Equipment. Mrs. Harris, on-the-other-hand, had no 
revenue stream during the divorce proceeding and non of the 
property she was awarded in the divorce proceeding were revenue 
generating assets. The only way Mrs. Harris has to provide for 
herself is to sell the property she was awarded in the divorce 
proceeding. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, the overriding 
consideration in property division is "that the ultimate 
division be equitable. Burt v. Burt quoting Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer. In this case, Mr. Harris was awarded a revenue-
producing asset valued at $450,000.00. Mrs. Harris was awarded 
non-revenue-producing assets valued at $365,000.00, plus cash in 
the amount of $56,000.00 to equalize the distribution. However, 
that award is per se inequitable. Mrs. Harris must sell the 
property she was awarded in order to support herself, while Mr. 
Harris simply keeps operating Aid Equipment as normal, 
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supporting himself and his children. He has no need to sell 
anything to support himself. 
The only way the trial court could attempt to equalize the 
inequity in its property distribution is to award Mrs. Harris 
alimony, equal to the revenue Mr. Harris is receiving and will 
receive from Aid Equipment. However, under the fundamental and 
overriding consideration in a property division, as stated in 
Burt v. Burt and Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, supra, requiring that the 
ultimate division be equitable, Utah law does not permit the 
trial court to give the revenue generating property to one party 
to a divorce proceeding and the non-revenue generating assets to 
the other party and call the distribution equal and equitable. 
Under Utah law Mrs. Harris is required to seek employment 
after her divorce; however, her need for alimony must be 
evaluated in light of her situation at the time of the divorce. 
See, Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), declaring "One of 
the important factors is that it should be the policy of the law to encourage one receiving 
alimony to seek employment/' However, in Mrs. Harris's case she was 56 
years old at the time of the divorce and had not been employed 
for seven years. Since the divorce she has continually sought 
employment, but has only recently been able to obtain on-call 
employment. 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered the appropriateness of alimony after a 
long term marriage, where the wife worked primarily in the home, 
had limited job skills, and was in her late forties or fifties. 
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The Cour t s t a t e d : "It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in her mid-50 s 
with no substantial work experience or training will be able to enter the job market and support 
herself in anything even resembling the style in which the couple had been living, " 
Mrs. Harris7 situation is not dissimilar to that in Jones v. 
Jones. It is not realistic to expect that Mrs. Harris at age 
58, with limited job skills can go into the work force and 
provide for herself in a manner that even resembles the style in 
which she and Mr. Harris had been living prior to their divorce. 
Furthermore, because of Mrs. Harris' health and heart condition, 
her health insurance alone costs her $450.00 per month. Mr. 
Harris and Aid Equipment should be required to maintain heath 
insurance on Mrs. Harris. 
In failing to award Mrs. Harris alimony, the trial court 
failed to make sufficient findings of fact with regard to: 
1) Mrs. Harris' standard of living at the time of her 
separation from Mr. Harris; 
2) Mrs. Harris' financial condition and her need for 
alimony; 
3) Mrs. Harris' earning capacity, taking into account Mrs. 
Harris' need for alimony considering her age, medical 
condition, seven-year absence from the workforce; 
4) Mr. Harris' ability to provide support and to properly 
consider the amount of money he was truly receiving from Aid 
Equipment and CST Engineering; and 
5) overall equity of the property distribution, absent an 
award of alimony. (Record at page(s) 783). 
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Under Utah law a trial court is required to consider at 
.east: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. UCA 30-3-5(7) 
Cn the instant matter, the trial court failed to consider these 
Items and/or failed to enter proper findings with respect to these 
Items while denying Mrs. Harris alimony. That failure is 
prejudicial and reversible error. Therefore, Mrs. Harris is 
sntitled to have that portion of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
and Supplemental Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law reversed 
tfith instructions to the trial court to properly and fully consider 
all facts relevant to awarding Mrs. Harris alimony and to make 
specific findings on each fact considered. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT MRS. 
HARRIS' MOTHER'S HOME, WHICH MRS. HARRIS WAS PURCHASING FROM 
HER BROTHER AND SISTER WAS MARITAL PROPERTY TO BE DISTRIBUTED 
BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. HARRIS. 
Under Utah law, each party to a divorce proceeding is 
presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property upon dissolution of 
the marriage. See: Hall v. Hall, supra; Burt v. Burt, supra. 
Although the term "marital property" is not defined in the 
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divorce code. The definition of marital property (for purposes 
of probate) was previously set forth in UCA §75-2-202(2) (a) . 
That definition provides as follows: 
For purposes of Subsection 75-2-201(1), 'marital property" means ... property 
acquired. .. subsequent to the . . . marriage . . . except: (i) property acquired by gift, 
devise, or descent; (ii) property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to 
the . . . marriage . . . or in exchange for property acquired by gift, devise, or descent; 
and (Hi) the increase, rents, issues, and profits on property acquired prior to the... 
marriage. . . and on property described in (i) and (ii). 
(Emphasis added). 
The Utah appellate courts have made it very clear that 
inherited property, as well as its appreciated value, is 
normally separate property. See Noble v. Noble, supra; 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, supra. Additionally, the Utah 
appellate courts have made it very clear that before a trial 
court can include either of the parties' separate property from 
gifts or inheritance in the marital estate, it must find unique 
circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that 
premarital property is separate property. See: Noble v. Noble, 
supra); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, 
those findings must be sufficiently detailed to show how the 
court distributed the parties' property. See: Marchant v. 
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
It is an undisputed fact that Mrs. Harris, her brother and 
sister jointly and equally inherited an interest in their 
mother's home at the time of her death. It is also undisputed 
fact that at the time of the divorce proceeding and property 
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distribution Mrs. Harris was purchasing her brothers and 
sister's interest in their mother's home from her brother and 
sister. 
It is also an undisputed fact that Mrs. Harris treated the 
Inheritance of her mother's home as her separate property. The 
ancontradicted testimony is that all income from the rental of 
the home was maintained in a separate account to which Mr. 
Harris had no access. All payments on the home came from the 
separate account. Mr. Harris was never listed as an owner of 
the property, and the home was never commingled with Mr., and 
Mrs. Harris' marital property. Therefore, under Utah law, the 
interest Mrs. Harris inherited in her mother's home was separate 
property and could not properly be included as marital property 
to be distributed between Mr. and Mrs. Harris in their divorce 
proceeding. 
It was improper for the trial court to consider Mrs. 
Harris' interest in her mother's home which she and her brothers 
inherited from their mother, during the time of Mrs. Harris' • 
marriage to Mr. Harris, as marital property to be divided 
between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. There were no unique circumstances 
present in this case that justified the trial court disregarding 
the general rule that inherited property is separate property, 
as required by Noble v. Noble and Walters v. Walters, supra. 
Furthermore, the trial court made no detailed findings 
justifying its decision to disregard the general rule that 
inherited property is separate property, as mandated by 
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Marchant v. Marchant, supra. 
The trial court erred as a matter of fact and law in 
concluding that Mrs. Harris' interest in her mother's home which 
she inherited during her marriage to Mr. Harris was marital 
property which could lawfully be distributed between Mr. Harris 
and Mrs. Harris. That error was prejudicial and reversible. 
Therefore, Mrs. Harris is entitled to order from this Court 
reversing that portion of the Supplemental Decree Divorce that 
improperly awarded one half of Mrs. Harris' interest in her 
mothers home to Mr. Harris and remanding the case back to the 
trial court with instructions to enter a new decree divorce 
which does not include Mrs. Harris' mother's home as a marital 
asset to be distributed between Mr. and Mrs. Harris. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW REQUIRING MRS. 
HARRIS TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE NORMAN/LOEBBECKE FEES ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
As previously set forth in this brief, the trial court 
permitted Mr. Harris to submit documents and evidence to 
Norman/Loebbecke allegedly documenting marital assets and the 
values of those assets without any restriction or limitation 
whatsoever. In contrast, however, Mrs. Harris was restricted 
and limited in what material she could present to 
Norman/Loebbecke for consideration in determination of the value 
of marital assets. Furthermore, Mrs. Harris was required to pay 
at her sole expense the total cost of having Norman/Loebbecke 
review any matter submitted to them subsequent to September 28, 
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.999. At the same time, however, Mr. Harris was permitted the 
right to submit unrestricted an unlimited material to 
lorman/Loebbecke for consideration. Additionally, Mrs. Harris 
tfas required to pay one-half of the cost of all work performed 
}y Norman/Loebbecke on behalf of Mr. Harris after the trial 
:ourt precluded Mrs. Harris from submitting any material of any 
mature whatsoever to Norman/Loebbecke. 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates was authorized by the trial 
:ourt on February 23, 1998 to determine the values of the 
narital property of Mr. and Mrs Harris. (Record at page(s) 
273). Norman/Loebbecke Associates was originally employed by Mr. 
Harris and for much of the time that the firm was allegedly 
performing services in this matter it was operating under the 
anderstanding that it was working solely for Mr. Harris. (Record 
at page(s) 1072,1075). Norman/Loebbecke's billings speaks of 
Vhr. Harris as the "client" and contains billings for meetings 
with "client and counsel." (Record at page(s) 1073) 
In its representation of Mr. Harris, Norman/Loebbecke 
engaged in activities beyond the scope of the authority given it 
by the trial court or agreed to by the Stipulation between Mr. 
and Mrs. Harris. Examples of inappropriate, unauthorized, 
redundant and useless "work" include: review of trial tapes at 
the request of Mr. Harris's counsel; preparation and review of 
settlement offers at the request of Mr. Harris's counsel; review 
of tax returns on behalf of Mr. Harris; consultation with Mr. 
Harris' counsel; review of monthly living expenses; creation of 
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spreadsheets of personal taxes for years 1990 through 1997; 
letters to Mr. Harris's counsel; reviewing Mr. Harris's 
counsel's files; meetings with Mr. Harris; meetings with Mr. 
Harris's counsel regarding outcome of hearings; analyzing tax 
returns for Mr. Harris; discussing legal matters with Mr. 
Harris's counsel, i.e, admissibility of Respondent's documents; 
reviewing affidavits of Mr. Harris' counsel; conferencing with 
Mr. Harris's counsel regarding "discovery legal issues; 
researching issues addressed in Mr. Harris's counsel's 
affidavit; consultation with Mr. Harris's counsel regarding 
proposed content of affidavit; researching possible division of 
Sandy property; consultation with Mr. Harris' counsel regarding 
court's ruling and division of assets, revaluing property at 
different dates at the request of Mr. Harris. (Record at page(s) 
1281: 438, 440-441,444) 
The indisputable evidence in this case demonstrates that 
much of the work allegedly performed by Norman/Loebbecke 
Associates in this case was performed at the sole request of Mr. 
Harris and for the sole benefit of Mr. Harris. (Record at 
page(s) 1283: Plaintiff's Exhibit #3). Furthermore, much of the 
work allegedly performed by Norman/Loebbecke Associates in this 
case was work that was beyond the scope of authority given the 
firm pursuant to this Court's February 23, 1998 order. The 
February 23, 1998 Court order only authorized and empowered 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates to determine the values of the 
assets of Mr. and Mrs. Harris. (Record at page(s) 270-271). It 
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lid not authorize or empower, of Norman/Loebbecke Associates to 
>repare or review settlement proposals, prepare or review 
>roposed asset distributions, review court proceedings, review 
iffidavits, prepare spreadsheets of tax returns. (Record at 
>age(s) 270-271) 
Mrs. Harris should not be required to pay for work performed 
solely at the request of Mr. Harris or his counsel. Brad 
townsend even admits that Mr. Harris requested that some of the 
rark be preformed and that the work was only performed after Mr. 
larris agreed to pay for that work, yet the cost of that work is 
Deing billed to Mrs. Harris, even though Mr. Harris agreed to 
Day for it. 
Likewise, Mrs. Harris should not be required to pay for work 
performed that was outside the scope of authority given 
sTorman/Loebbecke by the Stipulation. Therefore, Mrs. Harris 
should only be required to pay that portion of the fees of 
sTorman/Loebbecke that related to work actually performed at the 
request of Mrs. Harris or work that was necessarily performed in 
valuation of the martial assets as directed by the February 23, 
L998 Order of the trial court, based on the Stipulation between 
^rs. Harris and Mr. Harris. 
Because of Norman/Loebbecke improperly billed for work 
performed exclusively at the request of Mr. Harris and for the 
sole benefit of Mr. Harris, Mrs. Harris should not be required 
bo pay for that alleged work. Because Norman/Loebbecke 
allegedly performed, and undoubtedly charged for work which was 
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outside the scope of its authority granted it by the 
Stipulation, Mrs. Harris should not be required to pay for that 
alleged work. 
The indisputable facts of this case clearly and 
unequivocally establish that the vast majority of the work 
allegedly performed by Norman/Loebbecke was work performed for 
the sole benefit of Mr. Harris, at Mr. Harris 7 sole request and 
that the alleged work that was unrelated to valuation of assets 
in this case. Therefore, Mrs. Harris should not be required to 
pay for that unnecessary, unauthorized and useless work. Mrs. 
Harris never agreed to permit Norman/Loebbecke to do anything 
other than to determine the value of marital assets. She would 
never have agreed to permit Norman/Loebbecke to conduct 
unlimited and unrestricted work at the request of Mr. Harris and 
to agree to pay for work conducted at Mr. Harris' sole request 
and for his sole benefit, when that alleged work had nothing 
whatsoever to do with determining the value of marital assets. 
The trial court erred as a matter of fact when it concluded 
that the alleged "work" performed by Norman/Loebbecke was within 
the scope of the work authorized by the court, within the scope 
of the services to be performed by Norman/Loebbecke according to 
the Stipulation between Mr. and Mrs. Harris and of any benefit 
to Mrs. Harris. The trial court erred as a matter of law when 
it concluded that Norman/Loebbecke could perform work beyond the 
services agreed to by Mr. and Mrs. Harris in the Stipulation, 
i.e., determining the value of marital assets. The trial court 
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irred as a matter of law when it expanded the authorization of 
forman/Loebbecke to perform "work" beyond the scope of 
imployment set forth in the Stipulation. And the trial court 
>rred as a matter of law when it required Mrs. Harris to pay for 
:he unrestricted and unlimited work performed by 
lorman/Loebbecke at the request of Mr. Harris, which had nothing 
whatsoever to do with evaluation of marital assets, while at the 
same time limiting Mrs. Harris7 right to have Norman/Loebbecke 
)erform any work on her behalf and requiring her to pay the 
:otal cost of all work performed at her request. 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
\zhen it approved the Norman/Loebbecke bill, and it committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it ordered Mrs. Harris to 
Day half of the cost of the unnecessary, unauthorized and 
iseless work performed by Norman/Loebbecke, at the sole request 
and for the sole benefit of Mr. Harris and his counsel. 
Therefore, Mrs. Harris is entitled to have that portion of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce and the Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law ordering her to pay one-half of the 
Norman/Loebbecke fees reversed and have this case remanded to 
:he trial court with instructions that Mrs. Harris is only 
Dbligated to pay for work performed by Norman/Loebbecke which 
she actually requested be performed, and that work performed 
tfhich directly related to the evaluation of Mr. and Mrs. Harris' 
narital assets. However, remand to the trial court on this 
issue will not be necessary if this Court orders that Aid 
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Equipment be required to pay Mrs. Harris7 cost and attorney's 
fees as it paid Mr. Harris' cost and attorney's fees. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING DETERMINE 
WHETHER OR NOT MR. HARRIS HAD ANY INTEREST IN CST AND TO INCLUDE 
MR. HARRIS' INTEREST IN CST AS A MARITAL ASSET TO BE DIVIDED 
BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. HARRIS IN THEIR DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, the trial court erred 
and committed reversible and prejudicial error when it failed to 
determine what property belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was 
marital property. The trial court improperly and unlawfully 
permitted Brad Townsend of Norman/Loebbecke to make the 
determination as to what property belonging to Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris was or was not marital property as well as making the 
determination as to who actually owned the property. 
In the instant matter, Mrs. Harris presented substantial 
evidence to the court that indicated that Mr. Harris had an 
interest in CST. Mr. Harris's son Scot even admitted under oath 
at trial that CST was "Craig, Scot and Troy", i.e., Craig 
Harris. (Record at page(s) 1279-332). Scot also testified that 
he was making $90,000.00 per year from CST and an additional 
$35,000.00 from Aid Equipment, while at the same time Mr. Harris 
was claiming he only made some $20,000.00 plus from Aid 
Equipment and had no income from CST. (Record at page(s) 1279-
341). However, in spite of the evidence presented to the trial 
court, the trial court failed to make a determination as to 
whether or not Mr. Harris had an interest in CST and whether or 
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lot Mr. Harris' interest in CST was a marital asset to be 
iivided between Mr. and Mrs Harris in their divorce proceeding. 
(Record at page(s) 1076-1078; 1281: 522-523) 
Mrs. Harris also presented substantial and compelling 
evidence to Norman/Loebbecke that Mr. Harris had a real and 
substantial interest in CST. Mrs. Harris specifically asked 
Townsend to investigate Mr. Harris' interest in CST. Townsend, 
however, refused to investigate Mr. Harris' interest in CST. 
Townsend justified his failure to investigate Mr. Harris' 
interest in CST because Mr. Harris said he had no interest in 
CST. (Record at page(s) 1076-1078; 1280-254; 1279-335; 1281-
458-459) 
As previously established in this Brief, the trial court is 
required, as a matter of law, to determine what property 
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harris was marital. See: Hall v. Hall, 
Supra; Burt v. Burt, Supra. The trial court cannot abdicate that 
responsibility to another and cannot simply accept the position 
of one party to the divorce with respect to what constitutes 
marital property. 
The trial court is also required to consider all marital 
property when making a property distribution. Marital property 
is all property acquired during marriage except property 
acquired by gift or inheritance, and it encompasses all of the 
assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived. See: Dunn v. Dunn, 
Supra, quoting Supra. 
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The failure of the trial court to determine whether or not 
Mr. Harris had an interest in CST and include Mr. Harris' 
interest in CST as an asset to be divided between Mr. and Mrs. 
Harris in their divorce proceeding is prejudicial and reversible 
error. Therefore, Mrs. Harris is entitled to have this court 
remand this case to the trial court with instruction to have the 
trial court determine whether or not Mr. Harris has an interest 
in CST, the nature of that interest, the value of that interest 
and to divide that interest between Mr. and Mrs. Harris, as 
mandated under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Mrs, Harris respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the decision of the trial court and instruct the trial to 
court to: 1) determine what assets of Mr. and Mrs. Harris are in 
fact marital property and to include those assets in the property 
distribution between Mr. and Mrs. Harris; 2) permit Mrs. Harris 
to present evidence to the trial court establishing the existence 
and value of excluded marital assets; 3) require Aid Equipment to 
pay Mrs. Harris' costs and attorney's fees, as it paid Mr, 
Harris'; 4) award Mrs. Harris a proper amount of alimony after an 
eighteen-year marriage with consideration for Mrs. Harris' health 
situation; 5) award Mrs. Harris an additional 10% of the value of 
Aid Equipment, representing her share of the 20% unlawfully 
transferred to Mr. Harris's sons; 6) find that Mrs. Harris' 
mother home is and was Mrs. Harris' sole and separate property; 
and 7)determine Mr. Harris' true interest in CST, determine the 
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lue of that interest and to award Mrs. Harris her fair share of 
at interest. The undisputable evidence in this case clearly 
d unequivocally establishes that Mrs. Harris is entitled to the 
quested relief. 
Respectfully submitted this *>' day of October 2001. 
arles A. Schultz 
torney for Bonnie Harris 
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JUDGMENT 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BONNIE HARRIS 
SUPPLEMENTARY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Respondent. 
Civil No. 954402034DA 
Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
J J 
Wfrf 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16,17 and September 23,1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12,1999. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23,1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12,1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22, 
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
A 
26,1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and the Court having reviewed the evidence and the record, and being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The property shall be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being 
January 26,1999. 
3. The following deductions shall be subtracted from the Respondents premarital assets: 
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; 
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 
1999. 
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
5. The total net divisible value of the estate at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A. A copy of said Schedule A 
is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein. 
6. Included in this total value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a 
2 
value of $28,754.00. The Signetics retirement account is to be divided according to the formula 
stated in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties shall enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire. 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of $141,800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court awards Petitioner the 
business, AID Equipment Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 
172 West 9400 South in Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is 
$147,533.00, and the value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, 
Petitioner is awarded property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule 
A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. Therefore, 
Respondent is awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. Because the total value 
distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent is entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
3 
10. The Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
11. Each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, with the exception of 
the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded Petitioner a reasonable 
attorney's fee for bringing the October 19,1998, Order to Show Cause. 
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48, 
however, pursuant to the Court's Findings, only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's 
affidavit were related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court thus awards the Petitioner 
$2,564.16 in attorney's fees for the October 19,1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its 
January 26,1999 Order. 
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES 
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. 
14. Respondent is ordered to bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and separate 
obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates. 
15. The Court orders that both parties shall equally bear the remaining fees of 
$20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is required to 
pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay $10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the 
Court orders that the Petitioner be responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
4 
the property division. 
17. The Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award of $2,564.16 
to Petitioner for attorney's fees and offset by $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman Loebbecke 
fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and personal property 
division as ordered by the Court. 
19. The Court orders that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner be stayed sixty 
(60) days after the entry of this Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the 
judgment. ^ 
DATED t t a s ^ ^ a y of November, 1999. 
BY THE/COURT: ^M-tPz/v^ 
Approved as to Form: -**<****** ft* 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
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Schedule A 
Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
per Craig Hams 
Proposed 
Distribution 
Description 
Cash & Cash Equivalents 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Credit Union 7592 D Savings 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.1 Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-3Q939-5 Personal Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31376-5 Special Checking 
Stocks and Bonds 
InterWest Medical stock 
Retirement A ccounts 
Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard 
Dean Witter 179 D395D9 IRA Standard 
Prudential Securities OUQ-R68840-41 Simple IRA 
Signetics Retirement 
Life Insurance 
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W 
New York life 42594539 Term Life 
L an d/Residence 
House and Lot located at 692 S. Juniper St, Pleasant Grove, UTB 
Commercial Bldg, and House located at 172 W, 9400 $., Sandy, UT 
House and Lot located at 1328 N. Locust Lane, Provo, UT 
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property 
Businesses 
AID Equipment Company, fna 
Vehicles 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1983 26' Komfort 5th Wheef Trailer Nga^ 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Net 
Value Bonnie Craig 
1,090 $ 
1,279 
235 
554 
$ 1,090 
1,279 
235 
554 
3,161 
14,409 
14,409 
554 
-
2,607 
14,409 
14,409 
36,923 
48,918 
2.666 
28,754 
48.918 
28,754 
36,923 
2,666 
117,262 
16,042 
16,042 
77,672 
-
39,589 
16,042^ 
16,042 
103,591 
46,443 46,443 
41,116 
28,053 
4,160 4,160 
103,591 
425,196, 
41,116 
28,053 
^^^J^ii 
Furniture/Furnishings/Appliances 
Furniture and Personal Property - Craig 
Jeweky 
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie 
Other Assets 
Gun reloading equipment 
Debts and Liabilities 
648,559 
147,533 
M.?*. .147,533 
6,613 
2,500 
12,213 
5,000 
2,200 
8,395 
15,595 
500 
500 
50,603 
* 
6,613 
8,100-
9,713 
*• — 
2,200 
4,198 
6,398 
> 
-
597,956 
147,533, 
147,533 
2,500 
2,500 
5,000 '• 
4,198 
9,198 
500 
500 
P u R L E D 
of Utah County, State of 5 
Depul 
J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BONNIE HARRIS 
Respondent. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 954402034DA 
Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16,17 and September 23,1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12,1999. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23,1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12,1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22, 
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
fl-7 
26, 1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. In ruling on the remaining issues, the Court carefully considered and 
weighed the evidence relating to: (1) the amount and kind of property to be divided; (2) whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; (3) the source of the property; (4) the 
health of the parties; (5) the parties' standard of living; (6) the parties' respective financial 
conditions, needs and earning capacity; (7) the duration of the marriage; (8) the children of the 
marriage; (9) the parties' ages at the time of the marriage and of the divorce; (10) what the parties 
gave up because of the marriage; and (11) the necessary relationship the property division has 
with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Therefore, having carefully 
reviewed the evidence and the record in light of the above factors, and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court now makes the following Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in this matter: 
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable and finds that the property should be 
valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being January 26,1999. 
3. In a document entitled "Calculation of Division of Value per Bonnie Harris" 
2 
submitted at the October 12, 1999 hearing, Respondent acknowledged certain reductions in her 
premarital assets: 
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; and 
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 
1999. 
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are thus reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
5. The Court finds that the total net divisible value of the estate at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A, prepared by Norman 
Loebbecke Associates. A copy of said Schedule A is attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
6. Included in this total value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a 
value of $28,754.00. The-Signetics retirement account should be divided according to the 
formula stated in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties should enter 
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire. 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of $141,800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
3 
Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court finds that the parties 
marital property is most equitably divided by awarding Petitioner the business, AID Equipment 
Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 172 West 9400 South in 
Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is $147,533.00, and the 
value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, Petitioner is awarded 
property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent should be awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in 
Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the 
exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided pursuant to Woodward as set forth 
above. Therefore, Respondent should be awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. 
Because the total value distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent should be 
entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
10. In considering whether the Respondent is entitled to alimony, the Court considered 
the financial condition and needs of the Respondent; the Respondent's earning capacity or ability 
to produce income; the ability of the Petitioner to provide support; and the length of the marriage. 
Having considered these factors in light of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the 
Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner having duly considered the 
following factors as set forth below, weighing each factor as indicated: 
4 
(a) The Financial Condition and Needs of the Recipient Spouse: The Court finds 
that the parties' respective standards of living at the time of marriage were both significantly 
enhanced during the marriage. Due consideration has been given to attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standard of living. Viewing the facts most favorable to the Respondent; her 
premarital separate net assets were $78,804.00. Considering all factors, setoffs, and adjustments 
taken from the report of the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates, Respondent is awarded 
assets with a net value of $441,761.50 in this matter. The substantial assets Respondent has 
received will contribute to and assist the Respondent with her ability to support herself. 
(b) The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce Income. The parties 
were separated in August 1995 and the divorce was filed in September 1995. Before and during 
the marriage and through 1992, the Respondent was employed at Signetics, a semi-conductor 
company in Quality Assurance/Quality ControL After her employment ended with Signetics, the 
Respondent attended college classes in business. The Respondent did not seek employment after 
her employment ended and stayed home to take care of a grandchild during which time she was 
receiving temporary support from the Petitioner. The Respondent testified that for the past 
several years, she had no physical or mental disability which prevented her from being gainfully 
employed. 
(c) The Ability of the Payor Spouse to Provide Support. The Petitioner's earning 
power is reflected in the valuation of the business. The value of that business is divided between 
the parties as reflected in the accounting report of Norman/Loebbecke Associates. 
5 
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(d) The Length of the Marriage. The parties were married for over 16 years from 
the time of the marriage in 1992 until the parties divorce was final in January 1999. 
(e) Whether the Recipient Spouse Has Custody of Minor Children Requiring 
Support. No Children have been born in the marriage and none are expected. 
(f) Whether the Recipient Spouse Worked in the Business Owned or Operated 
by the Payor Spouse. During the marriage, the Respondent only worked for a short period of 
time at AID Equipment, Inc. 
(g) Whether the Recipient Spouse Directly Contributed to Any Increase in the 
Payor Spouse's Skill by Paying for Education Received by the Payor Spouse or Allowing the 
Payor Spouse to Attend School During the Marriage. The Respondent did not directly contribute 
to any increase in the Petitioner's skills pay or pay for his education. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
11. The Court finds that each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, 
with the exception of the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded 
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing the October 19,1998, Order to Show Cause. 
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48. 
Upon review of counsel's affidavit the court finds that many of the entries were not related to the 
Order to Show Cause but were for work done prior to drafting and preparing for the Order to 
Show Cause. The Court finds that only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's affidavit were 
related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court awards Petitioner $2,564.16 in attorney's fees 
6 
for the October 19,1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its January 26,1999 Order. 
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES 
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. 
14. The Court finds that Respondent should bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and 
separate obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates. 
15. The Court finds that both parties should equally bear the remaining fees of 
$20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is therefore 
required to pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay 
$10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the 
Court finds that the Petitioner is responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
the property division. 
17. As set forth above, Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award 
of $2,564.16 to Petitioner for attorney's fees and $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman 
Loebbecke fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party should be ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and 
delivering the necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
7 
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19. The Court finds that it is proper that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner 
should be stayed sixty (60) days after the entry of the Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure 
funds to pay the judgment. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each party is awarded the property both personal and real as set forth in the above 
Findings of Fact. 
2. No alimony is awarded in this case. 
3. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, each party shall pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
4. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the parties shall share equally in the 
costs for Norman/Loebbecke. 
5. The Respondent is awarded JUDGMENT against the Petitioner in the amount of 
$53,313.75. 
6. Execution on the judgement is stayed for sixty days following the entry of an Order on 
this Ruling to allow Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the judgment 
7. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall be entered accordingly. 
8 
is DATED th V day of 
Approved as to Form: 
, 2000. 
BY THECOURT: 
YM. HARDING. 
District Court Jud! 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
RE: Respondent's Rule 59 Motion 
Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Respondent's Rule 59 Motion came before this Court on October 23, 2000. Petitioner, 
Craig Harris, was present with counsel Loren D. Martin. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was present 
with counsel Charles Schultz and J. Grant Moody. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and heard argument of counsel the court granted 
Respondent's Rule 59 motion, re-opened the matter pursuant to Rule 59, and ordered "a hearing, 
new hearing on the very limited and very narrow issue of the account, the fee accounting of 
Norman Loebbecke that has been submitted so that we can make a determination of whether or not 
the fees were within the scope of the Court's order for purposes of their allocation."1 
That hearing was originally scheduled for January 8, 2001, at 1:30pm, but was continued 
to February 13, 2001, at 2:30pm. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present with counsel Mark K. 
Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was present with counsel Charles Schultz and J. Grant 
Moody. After receiving evidence and hearing the testimony of witnesses, and having entered its 
supplementary findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court now orders and decrees the 
following: 
1. The allocation of the Norman-Loebbecke Associates fees as set forth in the 
Supplementary Decree of Divorce, dated November 22,1999, shall remain as ordered therein. 
Dated this , 2001 
Approved as to form and content: 
Charles Schultz 
Attorney for Respondent 
1
 Transcript of Hearing, dated October 23, 2000, page 56, lines 12-19. 
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Mail: PO Box 11590 
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Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
• AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: Respondent's Rule 59 Motion 
: Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
: Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Respondent's Rule 59 Motion came before this Court on October 23, 2000. Petitioner, 
Craig Harris, was present with counsel Loren D. Martin. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was present 
with counsel Charles Schultz and J. Grant Moody. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and heard argument of counsel the court granted 
Respondent's Rule 59 motion, re-opened the matter pursuant to Rule 59, and ordered "a hearing, 
new hearing on the very limited and very narrow issue of the account, the fee accounting of 
Norman Loebbecke that has been submitted so that we can make a determination of whether or not 
the fees were within the scope of the Court's order for purposes of their allocation."1 
That hearing was originally scheduled for January 8, 2001, at 1:30pm, but was continued 
to February 13, 2001, at 2:30pm. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present with counsel Mark K. 
Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was present with counsel Charles Schultz and J. Grant 
Moody. After receiving evidence and hearing the testimony of witnesses, the Court now 
supplements its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows: 
Findings of Fact 
1. With regard to the Order Re: The Accounting and Determination of Values that was 
signed by the Court on February 20, 1998, the Court finds that such order gave Norman-
Loebbecke Associates broad authority to carry out its responsibilities. 
2. The Court finds that the services performed and the fees incurred by the firm of 
Norman-Loebbecke Associates were within the scope of the Court's order. 
3. The Court finds that the services performed by the firm of Norman-Loebbecke 
Associates were useful to the Court in its determination of the issues in this case and thereby 
beneficial to both parties. 
4. The Court finds that its allocation of the Nonnan-Loebbecke Associates fees as set 
forth in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, dated November 22, 1999, was fair and equitable 
under the circumstances of this case. 
5. The Court finds that the allocation of the Norman-Loebbecke Associates fees as set 
forth in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, dated November 22, 1999, should remain as 
ordered. 
Conclusions of Law 
1
 Transcript of Hearing, dated October 23, 2000, page 56, lines 12-19. 
1. Having granted Respondent's Rule 59 motion the Court has authority to enter a 
new supplementary order. 
2. The allocation of the Norman-Loebbecke Associates fees as set forth in the 
Supplementary Decree of Divorce, dated November 22, 1999, shall remain as ordered therein. 
3. A supplementary decree of divorce shall issue reflecting the Court's conclusions 
entered herein. 
Dated this O/^of ^^T.\ 2001 
JY THE COURT: ^Hgj^ 
my 
TRICT fcOURT JUDjeft 
Approved as to form and content: 
r 
v ^ 
Charles Schultz 
Attorney for Respondent 
1 Q. After your mother's death... When, when 
2 did she die? Was that--
3 A. She died I believe it was May 1st of '93. 
4 Q. Prior to your mother's death though you 
5 had received the home from her with your brother 
6 and sister. Is that correct? 
7 A. No. It was after my mother's death. 
8 Q. Oh, so it was after? 
9 A. It was after her death that I bought, I 
10 gave my brother... 
11 I wanted to buy the home because it's 
12 where I grew up and I wanted to buy my brother and 
13 sister out of their one-third of their 
14 inheritance. 
15 Q. You didn't have to come up with any cash, 
16 did you? 
17 A. I gave them each $2,000 and then 
18 everything was put on a contract. 
19 Q. And where did the $2,000 each come from? 
20 A- Out of my savings account that I'd had 
21 in, with my kids' name on it. 
22 Q. Okay. So that was in a separate, one of 
23 the separate accounts? 
24 A. Yes, sir. 
25 Q. After you purchased the house from your 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 Q. Did you refuse or not? 
2 A. We were... Yes, sir. I did refuse. 
3 Q. Did you ever go down... Well, you've 
4 said he'd gone down to your business, which you 
5 say was your mother's house. 
6 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
7 Q. And he had worked on that business and 
8 done things there? 
9 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 Q. How much, how many times had you gone 
11 down to work at the business of Aid Equipment? 
12 A. I went down numerous times. I took 
13 vacations to go and work for Craig. 
14 Q. How many days did you actually work 
15 there? 
16 MR. MOODY: What period of time? 
17 Q. (MR. MARTIN:) At any time. 
18 A- (THE WITNESS:) Through the course of 
19 our marriage? 
20 Q. Uh-huh (affirmative)? 
21 A. Well, I had a full-time job. But like I 
22 said, I took vacations to go and help him. I took 
23 vacation time and would go help the man when he 
24 needed help. 
25 Q. Calling your attention to one occasion 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 borrow money to pay the taxes. 
2 Q. That's because he had paid them all 
3 before that? 
4 A. No, he didn't pay them before. I paid 
5 them. And I've got documents that show that it 
6 came out of that specific account. I operated 
7 that house out of that account. 
8 Q. So you, you have now a mother's house 
9 account. 
10 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 Q. So you've got the joint account, a credit 
12 union. 
13 A. No. I don't have the credit union 
14 anymore. 
15 Q. Well I'm, you're describing the ones you 
16 have. 
17 A. Okay. 
18 Q. You spent it? 
19 A. Yes. And Craig and I also had a joint 
20 account at a First Security Bank because when I 
21 first married Craig I had 65, 60 between 60 and 
22 $65,000 that was given to me from the previous 
23 marriage that I put it in an account with Craig 
24 and Bonnie Harris at First Security Bank. And 
25 that was back in '82. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 $16,000 you said the highest amount--
2 A. The, the highest at any 25 year given 
3 period would have been at the $16,000. 
4 Q. All right. And then you had a separate 
5 $10,000 in another separate account? 
6 A. In, yes, in a personal account. 
7 Q. You still have those, I suspect. 
8 A. No, I do not. No. The only account 
9 I've got is Craig and Bonnie Harris, that 
10 account. And I have an account that has my name 
11 on it solely. That's all I have. 
12 Q. Now is that another account other than 
13 the one, the 16, we've got the 16--
14 A. No, no, no. There is a checking account 
15 that I have had since my mother passed away I put 
16 in my name solely that I've operated the home in 
17 Provo as, as a business. Craig told me to set up 
18 an account in my name solely and then operate out 
19 of that account and run the home in Provo as a 
20 business. 
21 Q. Craig never contributed anything to that 
22 house? This is the mother's house? This is... 
23 Where, where is this located? 
11 * 
24 A. No. He never contributed other than over 
25 the course of the last couple years I've had to 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
J. Grant Moody, (6282) 
Charles A. Schultz, (4760) 
J. GRANT MOODY, PC. 
336 West Main Stieet 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-418! 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, : AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE KAY HARRIS 
Petitioner, 
BONNIE HARRIS Civil No 954402034 DA 
Respondent Judge Ray Harding, Jr 
STATE OF UTAH } 
SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH } 
Bonnie Harris being duly first sworn, deposes and states as follows-
1. I, Bonnie Harris, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit 
2. During the course of the divorce proceeding with Craig Harris, I spoke with Brad 
Townsend on several occasions. 
3. The first time I spoke to Mr Townsend was sometime in November 1998. My daughter 
Lisa was with me on that occasion 
EXHIBIT 2 
During that November meeting with Townsend, f asked him to check into various assets 
Craig claimed to have and the values of those assets At that time, Mr Townsend 
informed me that he could do anything for me because my attorney, Margo Hiller-Pollster, 
had not complied with the court order to submit documents to him. He also stated that he 
believed he was only working for Craig. He further stated that during his conversations 
with Hiller-Pollster he was lead to believe that he was working solely for Craig. 
Townsend further stated that he had first been approached by Login Martin and that 
Martin had given him the impression he, Townsend. was working solely for Craig Harris. 
During that meeting, 1 specifically asked Townsend to check on the following assets. 
a) Interwest Medical for ownership and value, 
b) Money life insurance for ownership and value, 
c) ownership and value of the Vernal property, 
d) ownership and value of the 4-wheelers; 
e) ownership and value of the jet ski. 
f) ownership and value of CST 
g) the transfer and value of the 20% of Aid Equipment Craig transferred after our 
separation, 
h) the value of the contents of the storage shed. located on the property on Orchard 
Drive 
After the Court granted me an extension under my Rule 60(b) Motion, 1 again asked 
Townsend to check on the referenced assets. He again failed to do so. 
With respect to Interwest Medical stock, Townsend simply asked Craig if he owned the 
stock Craig told him he owned 100% of it, but of course, Craig did not own it. 
With respect to the Money life insurance policy, Townsend did not check with Money for 
the value He again simply took Craig's word for the value 
With respect to the ownership and value of the Vernal property, Townsend again simply 
asked Craig if he owned it. Craig allegedly showed Townsend a deed, but Townsend 
never checked to see if the deed and been recorded Craig never paid taxes on the 
property or never recorded the deed. 
With respect to the ownership and value of the 4-wheelers, Townsend never checked to 
verify the ownership, title and registration of the 4-wheeiers. He simply asked Craig if he 
owned the 4-wheelers. Of course. Craig said he did not own them He said they belonged 
to his sons. 
With respect to the ownership and value of the jet ski, Townsend again simply asked Craig 
if he owned the jet ski, and Craig told him he did not have jet ski. But 1 showed 
Townsend pictures of the jet ski sitting in the storage shed. Still, he did not check to 
verify what Craig was telling him was true. 
With respect io ownership and vaiue of CST, once again, Townsend Just asked Craig if he 
owned any interest in CST. Townsend stated he could not check on CST because Craig 
Harris stated that he did not own any interest in CST 
H-Z7 
i 1 With respect to the transfer and value of the 20% of Aid Equipment Craig transferred 
after our separation, Townsend did nothing to verify the validity of the transfer or to 
document any payment or consideration for the transfer 
14. With respect to the value of the contents of the storage shed, located on the property on 
Orchard Drive, 1 also showed Townsend pictures of all of the things in the shed and 
explained to him that Craig was only claiming $5,000 00 in personal property while the 
pictures documented there was substantially more than $5,000.00 in personal property in 
the storage shed 
15. Townsend did not do anything I asked him to do in this case, but he did everything Craig 
asked him to do 
Dated this / y dav of m »JU 
Bonnie Harris 
, 2000. 
Subscribed and Sworn this 
A 
vJdML k* _, 2000. 
•f uininnsnitw | 
' P A S S 3 
MS MM am an* 
H*wGlKt.WMSe 
t—* <r*> 9\ 
JAMr5 K LOEBBECKE. CPA 
R S. KO TQWN5P.NT;. CPA 
KEaYR JOHNSON, CPA 
RICHARD B. VAN ALFEN, C?A 
JOSEPH D. KNUDSEN. CPA 
JOSEPH F. ZVOKF.K 
NORMAN/LOEBBECKE ASSOCIATES 
Accounting, Valuation and Economic Loss Consultants 
SUITE 320 
SALT LAKE CITY 
WAH 8*111 
PHONE (801) 539-1600 
FAX (801)539-1642 
November 6,1997 
Margo Hiller-Polster 
165 S. West Temple, Ste 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
Dear Ms. Hiller-Polster; 
Thank you for your inquiiy regarding business valuation services. 1 have attached my resume for 
your review. I have also enclosed a. list of law firms we have worked for. 
Fees for this engagement would be billed at our standard hourly rates. These rates are as follows: 
Kelly R. Johnson 
Staff Consultants 
Paraprofessionals 
SlOO/hr 
75/hr 
45/hr 
We estimate that totals fees to perform the business valuation would be S2,500-$3,OOO. This 
estimate does not include time for deposition and/or trial testimony. 
Please call me if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
i /V»-o« 
Kelly R. Johnson^ A 
Norman/Loebbccke Associates 
EXHIBIT 11 
MERRILL R NORMAN, CPA 
JAMES K. LOEBBECKE, CPA 
R. BRAD TOWNSEND, CPA 
KELLY R JOHNSON, CPA 
MICHELLE M KELLER. CPA 
CHORTNEYB RUESCH NORMAN/LOEBBECKE ASSOCIATES 
Accounting, Valuation and Economic Loss Consultants 
September 1, 1998 
139 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 320 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
PHONE (801) 539*1600 
FAX (801) 539-1642 
Margo Hiller-Polster 
3434 East 7800 South, Suite 245 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Re: Harris v. Harris 
Dear Ms. Hiiler-Polster: 
I am writing to update you on the status of the analysis we are performing related to the 
above-mentioned case. I also wanted to address a couple of issues that were raised in 
our telephone conversation the other day and propose some possible solutions. I have 
sent a copy of this letter to Mr. Martin since some of the issues addressed require 
attention from both parties. 
We have prepared a rough draft of an asset schedule that we typically prepare in 
marital dissolution matters. The schedule summarizes the assets of the parties and 
delineates the asset, the value of the asset, amounts owing against the asset and the 
net value of the asset. In the case of liabilities that are not directly related to a specific 
asset (such as credit card debt), the liability amount is shown as a reduction in the 
marital estate. An additional section of the schedule provides an area for proposed 
distribution of the assets and a calculation of "cash to balance". The information 
currently included in the asset schedule has been obtained by us from information that 
has been provided by Mr. Harris, including any references to assets owned or 
controlled by the Mrs. Harris. 
The Court's order regarding accounting in this case indicates that both parties are able 
to and expected to provide us with information as to their relative positions with regard 
to assets of the marital estate. You indicated in our conversation that nothing had been 
submitted to us on behalf pf Mrs. Harris due to your belief that we had not commenced 
our work. As you now are aware, we have begun our data collection and analysis and 
welcome any information that Mrs. Harris wishes to submit to evidence the identification 
and value of assets she believes are to be included in the marital estate. 
I have enclosed a rough draft of the martial asset schedule to assist you in focusing on 
•-* s \ 
marital dissolution setting, each party would present valuation information consistent 
with their own theories and the Court would consider such evidence in light of its 
rulings as to ownership and entitlement. In the case at hand, it is impractical and 
prohibitively costly for us to value the business at all the various dates required to be 
consistent with the various theories of both parties. A narrowing-down of this issue 
seems to make a lot of practical sense and will save both parties time and expense. 
As a final point, both parties to this matter will likely make claims to certain assets as 
being pre-marital and/or sole and separate under various theories. Such a 
determination is a legal determination, not a practical determination that can be made 
by Norman Loebbecke Associates. The parties should determine how disputes as to 
sole and separate property will be handled in the preparation of the final asset 
distribution schedule. There are also likely to arise disputes as to whether or not 
certain assets are even owned by either party. A similar process for determining 
ownership of such assets should be decided upon. 
Let me again reiterate that both parties have the right and responsibility to provide us 
with information in support of their position as to the existence and value of assets to 
be included in the marital estate. We are willing to meet with either party at a mutually 
convenient time to address the issues as ordered by the Court. 
It is a pleasure assisting you with this matter. Please call if there are any questions. 
Best Regards, 
fS"-A*l ^Jf^UO^^r^ 
Brad Townsend, CPA 
Enclosures 
cc: Loren Martin 
Craig Harris 
> ^ j 
Schedule A 
Harris v„ Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
Description 
ehicles 
1994 Ford Taurus GL 
1999 Ford F250 (owned by AID but booked after 10/19/98) 
1984(3) 26* Komfort 5th Wheel Trailer 
1978 26' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Jet Ski -1985 Kawasaki jet ski-purchased In 1990 for $450 (per CH, does not own) 
Four Wheelers (per CH, children own) 
urn*' 't/Furnishingi/Appliances 
F re and Personal Property 
Jewvtry 
Furniture and Personal Property 
ther Assets 
Gun Safe and Guns (per CH-glvan away to children per court order) 
Gun reloading equipment 
mngi Bonds 
ebts mnd Liabilities 
Chevy Chase MC 5422702009630393 
Discover Card 6011009384509944 
First Card Visa 5286308693382369 
First USA Visa 4417112157275639 
First USA Visa 4417122391252633 
JC Penney Acct. 6174500196 
U n e Bryant Acct. 779123330 
MBNA Visa Platinum 549091128219116 
Mervyn's Acct. 58208158803 
Nordstrom Acct. 73513822 
R^ *5|leyAccct. 3481503 
5 Note Payable to Charles A. Schuttz for Legal Fees 
Possession 
Bonnie 
Craig 
Craig 
Craig 
Date 
7/31/98. 5/31/98 
10/1/98 
6/5/95 
5/1/98 
Cost/ 
Market 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Ref. 
25 
la 
2a. 24 
Value Debt 
Net ' 
Value 
Craig 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Craig 
? 
? 
? 
M 
M 
M 
24 
24 
24 
5/1/98 M estimate 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Joint 
Joint ftjwwuu 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
Bonnie 
11/24/97 
10/12/97 
1/27/95 
11/23/96 
1/20/92 
1/22/95 
11/6797 
8/1/92 
6/12/92 
12/31/97 
9/27/96 
Grand Total 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
3a 
4a 
5a 
6a 
7a 
8a 
9a 
10a 
11a 
12a 
13a 
14a 
7.200 1.884 5.316 
31.895 28.605 3.290 
8,500 ^t&SfT^ 
2.500 ( 2 , 5 0 0 / 
50,095 
ill
 
52.500 
500 
500 
-
30.489 
-
-
-
19,606 
5,000 
10.000 
37,500 
52,500 
500 
500 
m 
-
7.653 
163 
144 
11.876 
42 
162 
7.035 
156 
123 
318 
43.500 
(7.653) 
(163) 
(144) 
(42) 
(162) 
(7.035) 
(156) 
(123) 
(318) 
(43,500) 
71.172, (59,296) 
$ 1,214,217 $ 292,181 $933,912 
Comments 
H 
QQ 
M 
NOTES 
1 As per request of legal counsel the tax Impact has not been considered We are able to determine the tax Impact If requested. 
2 Credit cards have been valued as of 10/31/97 per Courts order that each person pay own credit card debt 
3 Craig Harris does not beleve that the note payable to Charles A SchuKz Is a legitimate oblgadon of the marital estate. 
T I T U S / ^ISTRATION DISPLAY 
PLATE-NO OWN..-. DIST 
PRO!;" "ED RECORD 
MSRP i ._JROFILM 
060YAT HARRIS CRAIG 
PHYS=> 1,72 W 9 4 0 0 S 
MAIL=> "" " ' 
RENEWAL-DATE TYPE DESIGN 
08 00 Y C 
VEHICLE DESCRIPTION: 
STATUS TYPE MAKE STYLE 
P TP FORD 4C 
LESSEE INFORMATION: —~~ 
0 0 2 3 3 7 5 0 6 9 9 2 4 5 2 2 4 2 
SANDY UT 8 4 0 7 0 18 
CLASS: 2T 
TITLE-NO TYPE T-DATE P-SAFETY FLEET ACCT NO. 
8 5 5 0 0 8 4 L 0 9 2 4 9 8 . 
VIN 1FTNX21F5XEB6 0 8 0 8 V I N - S T - F L G 
MODEL YR CYL WT FUEL DISPL NADA KEY TRAN-D 
SRWF2S 99 08 12 D 1 6 0 8 0 0 X 2 1 0 9 0 2 9 9 
MAILING ADDRESS => 
LIEN HOLDER INFORMATION: 
NAME STREET ADDRESS 
NORTHWEST CR UN PO BOX 5 8 9 0 0 
CITY - - -
SLC 
- ST Z I P 
UT 8 4 1 5 8 
** PROTECTED RECORD,NOT FOR PUBLIC USE ** 
COMMENTS AREA: 
VIASTER 
ODOM-READING 0 0 0 0 0 7 ODOM-FLG Y 
O P - I D EXAM-OFF 
OR E 6 6 6 6 
EXHIBIT 5 
>*n S~) 
TITLE/REGISTRATION DISPLAY PROT~~TED RECORD 
PLATE-NO OWI DIST MSRP ' CROFILM 
3795AV HARRIS CRAIG 34C 0005505 06912432081 
HYS=> 172 W 9400 WEST SANDY UT 84070 18 
AIL=> CLASS: 2T 
RENEWAL-DATE TYPE DESIGN TITLE-NO TYPE T-DATE P-SAFETY FLEET ACCT NO. 
08 92 Y 3391342 N 082887 
EHICLE DESCRIPTION: VIN CCD14AB108702 VIN-ST-FLG 
STATUS TYPE MAKE STYLE MODEL YR CYL WT FUEL DISPL NADA KEY TRAN-D 
P TC CHEV PK C10C10 80 06 12 G 10800C14 090591 
ESSEE INFORMATIDNT 
AILING ADDRESS => 
IEN HOLDER INFORMATION: 
NAME STREET ADDRESS CITY ST ZIP 
DNE 
* PROTECTED RECORD,NOT FOR PUBLIC USE ** 
DMMENTS AREA: 
ODOM-READING ODOM-FLG 
OP-ID EXAM-OFF 
VSTER OR E6666 
EXHIBIT 6 
• — • r*in V^V/IVIIfllW90IWI^ 
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION 
1095 Motor Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-3294 
(801)538-8309 
Form 
TC-828 
Rev. 7/89 
^CLVCL. H - I N ^ 0 - »° ^ e c o ^ " W * V x ^ • i ^ \ ( _ < L _ O f " M L S " 
s«/_(L. \%^ O W N E R S H I P A F F I D A V I T A c c e ^ t f c O Lo i TUoo " * -
(For use with vehicle previously registered in a non-title state) " l - ( l^^tO -
/ I / 7 ^ ' / , Y < - (Address) 
f - f * (T/ZQvK t (/? / . State of Utah, being first duly sworn depose and say: 
(1) that I am the owner of, and in possession of, one motor vehicle: Make 
., Year \9X5 , VIN fAU) <T£-?.<;Ct. 9 IfS 
/o . day of
 m Mftzc/i 19 <?0; 
(Insert "NONE* if no lien) 
Dated this II** . day of 
__J9.Z2 
^ 1 ignature 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this IL 
My commission expires: Residing at:. 
Model 
(2) that I purchased for a valuable consideration the vehicle listed above from loop Kjof)/USo*J 
, of on the 
(3) that this vehicle is subject to an outstanding lien held by 
of State of 
and that there are no other liens outstanding; 
(4) that the papers which evidence my ownership of this vehicle and any lien thereon are attached to this 
document by this reference, are made on part of this affidavit, and 
(5) that in the event this said vehicle is registered and titled by reason of the allegations which I have set forth, 
and in the event that it is substantiated by any other action, or otherwise that this vehicle is encumbered, other 
than as shown herein, or that I am not the legal owner of and not entitled to the possession of, nor the title to, 
the aforesaid vehicle, then I hereby agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Utah State Tax Commission in 
perpetuity for the registering and titling of said vehicle. I further waive any and all rights, claims or causes of action 
which I now have, or which I may have in the future, against the Utah State Tax Commission or the authorized 
agents or employees of said Tax Commission acting within the scope of their employment in issuing a title on 
said vehicle or in registering the same. I further provide that if any person or persons suffer an actual or pecuniary 
loss as a result of this registration and issuance of title to said vehicle, then and in that case, I hereby agree to 
assume any and all said actual or pecuniary loss, suffered by any such person or persons. 
TC-828 Rev. 7/89 EXHIBIT 9 SPAX-0060 
^ 1 / . J~3T*J r * ^ 
kTE TAX COMMISSION 
EHICLE DIVISION 
rOR AVENUE 
ECfTY.UTAH 84116 
FORM TC687-A 
12-05-130 
REV. 03-26-86 
rOJPLEASE TYPE OR RBINT IN INK W READ INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIC 
* 
APPLICATION FOR: 
•LACE AN -X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
JSE FOR 1985 MODEL AND NEWER ONLY 
BOAT 
( A ) REGISTRATION 
AND TITLE 
!(B) BOAT TITLE • i ( C ) OUTBOARD MOTOR TITLE OVER 25 HORSEPOWER 
» 
TTTLEONLY 
UEN CHANGE c 
INFORMATION ^ OWNER I  
—STATE. 
® BOAT INFORMATION 
YEAR MAKE 
fcWAtijAs»k; I Jet&fi 
MODEL 
HULL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
Xft\AJS595Cl &?S 
HULL MATERIAL 
\%2l~ GLASS OR FIBERGLASS 
• WOOD • STEEL • PLASTIC 
D ALUMINUM • RUBBER 
CITY. . STATE- . ZIP. 
OUTBOARD MOTOR INFORMATION 
MAKE HORSEPOWER FUEL MOTOR NUMBER 
LENGTH 
•PROPULSION TYPE 
•
INBOARD r- i INBOARD 
EX.I /0&JET L J OUTDRIVE OUTDRIVE 
[g^ETDRIVE Q OUTBOARD | 
• AJRBOAT Q SAILBOAT 
TOTAL HP S/T FUEL 
ASSIGNED NUMBER 
OUTBOARD 
MOTOR DECAL 
O B M -
iJT&txq /j/t 
BOAT DECAL * 
BOAT DECAL 
EXPIRES 
EVIOUS REGISTRATION/TITLE INFORMATION 
TITLE#. 
YEAR, . DECAL#. 
STATE . ZIP-
© NOTE: THIS. SPACE MUST BE (1) STAMPED TO 
- SHOW TAX CLEARANCE OR (2) A CERTIFICATE 
OF ASSESSMENT FURNISHED TO THE OWNER 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 3 -
"PR0PEP.TY TAXES 
P A1 0" 
3UU111990 
UTAH COUNTY ASSESSOf 
© OFFICIAL USE ONLY - FEE SCHEDULE 
BOAT TITLE FEE $ 
BOAT REGISTRATION FEE : ..." $ « 
TRANSFER FEE % 
OUTBOARD MOTOR TITLE FEE ;:. . . . . . . . $ 
DUPLICATE TITLE FEE ... *. .:.*. .* £ . : L . * - $ 
DUPLICATE REGISTATION FEE ;^„V:; . . . . . i . . * ' •" 
OTHER FEES ;.,;;. v.. . . .vU/:r.r. . . . $ 
. JDTAL AMOUNT DUE . . . . . . . . . , . , , / S K . $ 
SECOND LIEN HOLDER FIRST LIEN HOLDER k
 ? j i^JJEN INFORMATION: © • 
CWJL 
STATE - 2IP-
NAME. 
ADDRESS -
CfTY. STATE-. ZIP. 
Ir(feiCOWMiSSIQN:>ftOLLiASSUME-APPMCANTJSLEGAL QWNERJF^Q UENHOUPEgtSiffiVEN fr>j • - r ,j. 
BOAT CERTIFICATE OF INSPECTION 
CERTIFY THAT I HAVE PERSONALLY INSPECTED THE BOAT DESCRIBED ABOVE AND FIND 
IPTION TO BE CORRECT. 
© OUTBOARD MOTOR CERTIFICATE OF INSPECTION 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE PERSONALLY INSPECTED THE OUTBOARD MOTOR DESCRIt 
ABOVE AND FIND THE DESCRIPTION TO EJE CORRECT 
SIGNED . 
. TITLE- . DATE- AGENCY. TTTLT-. :DATE. 
UTAH BOAT DEALER BILL OF SALE 
EW 
L E -
I USED DEALER NUMBER -
PERMIT NUMBER -
03) 
STATE OF UTAH: COUNTY OF . 
AFFIDAVIT OF OWNER 
AND.'CR OUTBOARD MOTOR HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE PERSON(S) NAMED AS' 
THE UNDERSIGNED DEALER WHO WARRANTS TITLE THERETO IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
OARD MOTOR TITLE ACT UTAH CODE ANN TITLE 41. CHAPTER 1. (1953) 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED. BEING RRST DULY SWORN. DEPOSE AND SAY THAT I AM THE OWNER OF 1 
BOAT/OUTBOARD MOTOR OESCRIBED ABOVE ANO THAT MY AODRESS GIVEN AND ALL OT> 
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREON IS ACCURATE ANO TRUE. 
/ " >r 
SIGNATURE^ dnrteEfS) (IF APPLICATION IS IN TWO OR MORE NAMES EACH MUST SIGN) 
J 
a 
^ $ * & > 
EXHIBIT 10 
rf- <? n 
1 But it was received after the date that the Court 
2 had ordered. 
3 Later in November of '98 we met with 
4 Mrs. Harris and her, her counsel and discussed a 
5 number of concerns that they had regarding 
6 accounting for the marital estate but more, most 
7 specifically transactions in Aid Equipment and 
8 ownership of CST Engineering. But at that point 
9 we had been instructed by Mr. Harris1s counsel 
10 that pursuant to the Court's order we could not 
11 consider this information in preparing the asset 
12 schedule. 
13 So as time went by there were various 
14 motions. Mrs. Harris engaged new legal counsel. 
15 And in the spring of 1999, I believe it 
16 was February or March, Mr. Harris's counsel 
17 approached us and said we realize there's these 
18 issues outstanding as to what documents can be 
19 considered and what can't, we believe the Court, 
20 the Court has signed the order, we believe the 
21 order is binding, we want you to go ahead and 
22 complete your asset schedule based on what 
23 information you currently have. 
24 So in I believe it was March, it may have 
25 been February but I believe it was March of 1999 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 Ms. Hiller-Polster would, would pursue these 
2 issues. In fact she indicated as reflected in my 
3 notes in an interview that I had with her, that 
4 she viewed the production of documents that would 
5 enable me to do such an investigation as her, well 
6 she referred to it as her problem, basically, that 
7 it was up to her to force the production of such 
8 documents and to clarify with the Court whether or 
9 not such work should be done and whether or not it 
10 should be funded by Mr. or Mrs. Harris. But that 
11 was ultimately never done. And so at this point 
12 there has not been an invest..., a detailed 
13 investigation of personal expenses in Aid 
14 Equipment or the possible concern that's been 
15 raised as to whether or not CST Engineering was 
16 somehow funded by Aid Equipment and somehow 
17 represented a conversion of a marital asset. So 
18 I do not have any kind of a conclusion on that 
19 point at this time. 
20 THE JUDGE: Questions? 
21 Q. (MR. MARTIN:) Had you talked to Troy 
22 Harris about CST? 
23 A. (THE WITNESS:) Yes, I had. Troy Harris 
24 met with me in I believe it was July of 1998 and 
25 had indicated that he and his brother Scott owned 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
PAGE 459 
1 indicated that she thought that there could be a 
2 subpoena issued but she didn't believe anyone in, 
3 in the organization could research it any more 
4 thoroughly than she had. 
5 So this is the best information we have 
6 on the line of credit at this point as to what the 
7 current balance is made up of. 
8 Schedule-J, which is the last schedule to 
9 PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #1, is a graph of the sales of 
10 Aid Equipment for the period 1979 through 1998. 
11 Mr. Martin asked that I prepare this 
12 simply so he would have a graphical presentation 
13 of, of the general state of the business from 1979 
14 forward, which is the earliest date we had records 
15 for. So I've provided that pursuant to 
16 Mr. Martin's request. 
17 And I believe that explains in a nutshell 
18 what"we've done and, and what these schedules show 
19 at this point in time. 
20 There were concerns that Mrs. Harris had 
21 with transactions in Aid Equipment and ownership 
22 of CST that for various reasons have not been 
23 investigated. 
24 Early on when we raised this question it 
25 was, it was my anticipation that 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
pz\r:p 4 R fi 
that I guess would be in dispute as to 
a category that g
 r„,,rt's 
,- -if falls within the Court s 
w h o, s, whether or not rt falls 
°
rder
Q' S o you might, it Might be helpful if we 
had a little direction on in really how to 
determine that. Because you have received agarn 
substantial amount of inflation even prior to 
the plaintiffs and the defendants, have you not. 
A Ves Now I, I brought with me today a 
collection of my billings but I'm not sure that 
the descriptions in the billings themselves would 
be specific enough to identify what .ay or may not 
flt within a certain description or, or fall 
within the court's order that Mrs. Harris pay 
certain costs. 
Q. YOU testified earlier, 1 believe, that 
•* uv Aid Eauiptnent for 
the legal costs had been paid by Aid Eq 
M r. Harris's legal fees in this matter. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And as well as your, your firm. 
A. with the exception of one payment. We 
sz ~™ T nrpn Martin's 
received one payment early on from Loren 
o«ic. and I, I couldn't even tell you the' 
II amount. But all of the other payments have been 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
PAGE 53 0 
1 from Aid Equipment. 
2 Q. And from Mr. Martin's you wouldn't know 
3 where those funds came from, whether it would be 
4 Aid or Mr. Harris individually. Correct? 
5 A. I wouldn't know. 
6 Q. And if I understood correctly when you 
7 valuated Aid Equipment you discounted, if I 
8 understood you correctly, those legal fees that 
9 were paid. Is that, did I understand that 
10 correctly? 
11 A. What I did... I'm not sure I know what 
12 you mean by discounted. What I did is I added 
13 back certain amounts of legal fees to the earning 
14 stream to increase the earning stream because it 
15 was artificially suppressed by the legal fees. 
16 Q. Did you specifically take the exact fees 
17 that were paid to Mr. Martin as related to this, 
18 this case? I mean--
19 A. No, I didn't. What I did is I looked at 
20 historical periods to see what the typical level 
21 of legal fees were in the past and I conclude 
22 that, that about $5,500 per year was typical and 
23 so anything in excess of $5,500 I added back to 
24 the earning stream. But I did not add back the 
25 specific legal fees for Mr. Martin. 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 Q. And you're the plaintiff's son. Is that 
2 correct? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And how old are you now? 
5 A. I am 24. 
6 Q. Are you? And where are you employed? 
7 A. Aid Equipment Company. 
8 Q. When do you, when... 
9 And are you in school right now? 
10 A. Currently I'm not. 
11 Q. So you work full-time for Aid? What is 
12 your duties there? 
13 MR. MARTIN: Excuse me, Your Honor. 
14 Just an objection to the comment on the evidence. 
15 THE JUDGE: Overruled. 
16 A. (THE WITNESS:) What is my duties 
17 there? 
18 Q. (MR. MOODY:) What are your duties at 
19 the employment at Aid Equipment? 
20 A. Personnel. 
21 Q. What does that mean? 
22 A. I keep people there or I fire people. 
23 Q. Okay. So, so you'hire and fire? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Do you have any other duties at Aid 
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1 Q. (MR. MOODY:) When CST was started in 
2 1995 did it have any assets? 
3 A. (THE WITNESS:) No. 
4 Q. How about shortly thereafter? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And could you describe what assets, say 
7 within the next six months CST had? 
8 A. I do not know. 
9 Q. When you mean, when you say it had assets 
10 could you describe those assets that CST had? 
11 A. I don't understand the question. When--
12 Q. Have... Let me rephrase the question. 
13 Have there been any assets that you've 
14 received from your father, Mr. Harris, or from Aid 
15 Equipment that have been transferred to CST? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Does CST own or has it ever owned a 1996 
18 Chevrolet pickup? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And how was that acquired? 
21 A. We purchased it. 
22 Q. You say we purchased it--
23 A. Me and Troy. 
24 Q. And how did you purchase that? For 
25 what? How did you... How did you pay for the 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
1 truck? 
2 A. I didn't pay for the truck. Troy did. 
3 Q. Okay. And how did Troy pay for the 
4 truck? 
5 MR. MARTIN: Objection, Your Honor. 
6 THE WITNESS: I do not know. I wasn't 
7 there when he did it. 
8 THE JUDGE: Overruled. 
9 MR. MARTIN: Okay. Thank you. 
10 MR. MOODY: Would you hand the 
11 defendant (sic) EXHIBIT #21? 
12 Could you identify that for the Court 
13 please? 
14 A. (THE WITNESS:) It looks like a receipt 
15 for a truck. 
16 Q. (MR. MOODY:) And would you look at the 
17 truck and see if that's the one that we're talking 
18 about? Just to see if you can identify that for 
19 the Court. I think just on the, on the about 
20 three inches down that there's identified, the 
21 truck is identified. Do you see that? 
22 A. Yes. It's a '96 Chevrolet. 
23 Q. And do you recognize, would that be the, 
24 the truck that CST owns? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And could you see when that truck was 
2 purchased? Could you see the date on that? It's 
3 on the upper right-hand corner. 
4 A. 1--
5 MR. MARTIN: Excuse me, Your Honor. I 
6 object to it. He's already testified that Troy 
7 was the one who purchased this and--
8 THE JUDGE: Overruled. 
9 A. (THE WITNESS:) 1-13-96. 
10 Q. (MR. MOODY:) Okay. And what name is 
11 listed as purchasing the pickup? Could you, right 
12 below the date could you read that for the Court 
13 please? 
14 A. Craig Harris. 
15 Q. Well, CST Engineering. Correct? Says 
16 CST Engineering, Craig Harris. 
17 A. Yes, it does. 
18 Q. And over on the left-hand, bottom 
19 left-hand corner, do you see a signature of who 
20 purchased the truck? Is that... Whose signature 
21 is that? Do you recognize that signature? 
22 A. It appears to be Craig Harris's. 
23 Q. And you're familiar with your father's 
24 signature? 
25 A. Fairly. 
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"$23,500"? 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MOODY: Does that appear that both 
trucks were traded in and given a $23,500 
balance? 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
MR. MOODY: Well, I think the contract 
speaks for itself. 
MR. MARTIN: Your Honor, the objection 
is the comment is on evidence, or the direction 
he's wanting this witness to go, it's improper, 
and adding comment on it. We can't find the 26--
THE JUDGE: I'll, I'll sustain the 
objection. It is improper to comment on the 
evidence, Mr. Moody. 
I apologize, Your Honor. 
As I did--
I apologize. 
Mr. Martin yesterday to 
refrain from comment on the evidence. 
Q. (MR. MOODY:) When CST was started or 
shortly thereafter, did CST open any bank 
accounts? 
A. (THE WITNESS:) Of course. 
Q. And what, what money was put into the 
MR. MOODY: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. MOODY: 
THE JUDGE: 
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1 account? 
2 A. I don't know. 
3 Q. You don't know? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Did you ever make a comment to one of the 
6 fellow employees that your dad had set you up and 
7 you wouldn't have to worry about having money in 
8 CST? 
9 A. I don't understand what you're asking. 
10 Q. Did you ever make any comments to any of 
11 your fellow workers that your dad had transferred 
12 some money into CST and that you would not have to 
13 worry about money for CST? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. You've never made that comment? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay. Did Aid Equipment ever transfer, 
18 either CST purchased or Aid Equipment ever 
19 transfer any equipment to CST? 
20 A. I don't know. 
21 Q. What is CST? Is it an ongoing company 
22 or could you explain a little bit? Do you have 
23 any income? 
24 A. It's an ongoing company. 
25 Q. And do you pay, what... Explain what you 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
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1 do, CST does. 
2 A. We are an employee leasing company. 
3 Q. And what does that mean, employee leasing 
4 company? 
5 A. We lease employees to other companies to 
6 use. 
7 Q. And such as do you lease any to Aid 
8 Equipment? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. What type of companies then or what... 
11 Name a couple of companies that you lease to just 
12 to give us an example. 
13 A. Boeing. 
14 Q. Boeing. So does Troy, he works up in 
15 the Seattle area. Is that... 
16 Do you have some leasing contracts with 
17 Boeing? 
18 A. Ask that again. I didn't hear part of 
19 it. 
20 Q. Do you have some leasing, employee 
21 leasing contracts with Boeing in Seattle then? 
22 A. Yes, we do. 
23 Q. And does Troy watch over that since he 
24 lives in the Seattle area? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Do you receive any compensation from CST? 
2 A. As in? 
3 Q. Either income or salary, wages? 
4 A. Of course. 
5 Q. And how much is that? 
6 A. How much did I claim on my taxes? 
7 Q. How much did you, approximately how much 
8 have you been making the last two years? 
11 * 
9 A. I made approximately $70,000 two years 
10 ago and this year approximately $90,000. 
11 Q. Approximately how much do you make at Aid 
12 Equipment? 
13 A. $35,000 . 
14 Q. And how long have you made $35,000? 
15 A. Last year. 
16 Q. So 1998, in 1998--
17 A. Last two years. 
18 Q. In 1996 how much did you make? 
19 A. I don't know. Can't remember. 
20 Q. Approximately? 
21 A. 60, 48, somewhere in there. 
22 Q. $60,000? $48,000? 
23 II A . I, I don't know. I can't remember. 
24 || Q. More than $50,000? 
25 || A. Yes. 
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1 Q. How about 1996? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. No what? 
4 A. No, I didn't make more than $50,000. 
5 Q. How much did you make in '96 
6 approximately? 
7 A. I have no idea. 
8 Q. How about 1995? 
9 A. I don't know. 
10 Q. Does Troy get a paycheck from Aid 
11 Equipment? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. You have a 10% ownership in Aid 
14 Equipment? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. When did you receive that 10% ownership? 
17 A. I can't remember. 
18 Q. Has it been since 1995? 
19 A. I think so. 
20 Q. Did you pay anything to your father for 
21 the 10%, or to Aid Equipment? 
22 MR. MARTIN: You mean cash? 
23 MR. MOODY: Cash. 
24 A. (THE WITNESS:) No. 
25 Q. (MR. MOODY:) Are you aware of a gun 
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Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James KL Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Tovmsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
m. 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
June 5, 1998 
Invoice #9805025 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craw Harris 
o 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
4/8/98 RBT Reviewed briefly the information provided by 0.50 
Loren Martin regarding case. 
4/10/98 RBT Met with Loren Martin to be read in to case 1.00 
facts and history. 
4/13/98 RBT Reviewed and summarized information provided 1.25 
on affidavit. Reviewed preliminary documents 
provided by counsel 
4/23/98 RBT Generally reviewed new documents provided by 1.50 
counsel. 
4/28/98 RBT Conferenced with Loren Martin. 0.25 
5/19/98 RBT Met with Deborah to supervise building of 0.25 
financial model. Conferenced with counsel 
regarding current status of case. 
DMR Created spreadsheet ot tax returns, personal and 2.00 
corporate for years 1990 through 1997. 
Organized binder. 
5/20/98 RBT Reviewed income tax return spread prepared by 1.00 
staff. 
Loren Martin \y 
Hours 
Page 2 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 7.75 $740.00 
Balance due $740.00 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
DMR-Deborah M. Ruesch 
5.75 
2.00 
Interest will be added at the rate of 18% per annum to all balances not paid within 30 davs. 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James K. Locbbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
rV^ 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City U T 84111 
Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
July 8, 1998 
Invoice #9806029 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craiz Harris 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
6/8/98 CBR Request of asset and liability information with 
request of monthly living expenses. 
6/10/98 CBR Edited and delivered report. 
6/23/98 CBR Sorted documents for preparing marital asset 
schedule. Prepared draft of marital asset schedule. 
Organized supporting documents. 
RBT Met with Loren Martin to review documents 
provided by client. 
6/24/98 CBR Prepared list of questions relative to asset 
schedule. 
3.25 
0.75 
6.25 
0.25 
1.25 
6/26/98 CBR Edited letter and delivered to counsel. 0.75 
Total for time charges: 
Interest on overdue balance 
Amount 
12.50 $746.25 
$12.04 
Total amount of this bill $758.29 
Previous balance $740.00 
Loren Martin 
f\^. 
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Amount 
Balance due $1,498.29 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
CBR-Chortney B. Ruesch 
Hours 
0.25 
12.25 
Current 30 Days 60Davs 90 Davs 120Davs 
J s j j 
758.29 740.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Your account has become 30 days past due. If you have any questions 
regarding your invoice, please contact our office at 539-1600. 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James JC Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle KeUer, CPA 
Chortncy B. Ruesch 
rV> 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
August 7, 1998 
Invoice #9807028 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
7/9/98 CBR Reviewed portion of counsel's files for 
information regarding marital assets. 
7/10/98 CBR Completed review of counsel's files. 
7/14/98 CBR Reviewed new data. Edited schedules. Prepared 
request for information from B. Harris. 
7/16/98 CBR Met with counsel and clients. 
CBR Draft of engagement letter. Edited draft of 
request to Bonnie Harris. 
RBT Reviewed documents and analysis performed by 
staff in preparation for meeting with Craig Harris 
and Loren Martin. Met with Loren Martin, Craig 
Harris, Troy Harris and C. Ruesch to discuss 
work performed to date and additional work to be 
performed. 
7/27/98 CBR^ Adjusted asset schedule for information from 
meeting with client. Discussion with B. 
Townsend. 
2.75 
1.00 
1.75 
2.50 
0.50 
3.25 
0.50 
m 
Loren Martin 
7/27/98 RBT Reviewed financial statements and documents 
previously provided by client in preparation for 
meeting with Craig Harris. Met with Craig Harris 
to review various issues related to the valuation of 
AID Equipment and toured facilities. 
Total for time charges: 
Interest on overdue balance 
Hours 
5.50 
Page 
Amount 
17.75 $1,635.00 
$11.04 
Total amount of this bill $1,646.04 
Previous balance 
7/22/98 Payment - thank you - Loren D. Martin, P.C. Ck #6349 
Balance due 
$1,498.29 
($740.00) 
$2,404.33 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
CBR-Chortney B. Ruesch 
Hours 
8.75 
9.00 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
1,635.00 746.25 23.08 0.00 0.00 
Your account is 60 days past due. Please contact our office at 539-1600 
at your earliest convenience. 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James K. Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
N/> 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
September 4, 1998 
Invoice #9808029 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
8/4/98 RBT Conferenced with counsel. 
8/17/98 RBT Conferenced with Mark Nelson regarding case 
and information being gathered. 
8/18/98 RBT Met with Craig Harris regarding financial 
information provided by accountant. 
8/25/98 RBT Conferenced with Margot Hiller-Polster. 
Conferenced with Mark Nelson. 
8/31/98 RBT Updated counsel and client on status of case. 
Total for time charges; 
Interest on overdue balance 
Hours 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.25 
Amount 
1.50 $180.00 
$10.62 
Total amount of this bill $190.62 
Previous balance $2,404.33 
Balance due $2,594.95 
Loren Martin 
Page 2 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 1.50 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
1,825.62 746.25 0.00 23.08 0.00 
Your account is 90 days past due. At your earliest convenience, please 
contact our office at 539-1600 to discuss payment arrangements. 
Infprpcf will ho firirlcvl nf #K*» ******. **f IQCL «~ 
Menill R. Norman, CPA 
James JC Locbbcckc, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
I m. 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt U k e City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
Octobers, 1998 
Invoice #9809024 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
9/1/98 RBT Reviewed file and prior information requests. 
Prepared letters to legal counsel to clarify various 
issues related to accounting and valuation work. 
Hours 
Total for-time charges: 
3.25 
Amount 
3.25 $390.00 
Previous balance 
9/23/98 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Co. Ck #30189 
9/30/98 Credit interest charges per B. Townsend. 
10/7/98 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #30248 
Total payments 
Balance due 
$2,594.95 
($1,826.04) 
($22.66) 
($746.25) 
($2,594.95) 
$390.00 
Consultant summarv 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 3.25 
I 
Craig Harris 
Page 2 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Memll R Norman, CPA 
James K. Loebbecke, CPA 
R Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kellv R Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B Ruesch 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
November 6, 1998 
Invoice # 9 8 1 0 0 3 0 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
10/14/98 RBT Met with Mark Nelson to discuss status of case 
and contact with Ms. Harris' legal counsel. 
10/23/98 RBT Met with Mark Nelson regarding outcome of 
hearing with Court and analysis to be 
performed. Also discussed possible production 
of documents to NLA by Ms. Harris. 
10/30/98 MMK B. Townsend provided case background and 
explained tasks to be performed to complete 
business valuation. Read case notes. 
RBT Met with staff to supervise creation of valuation 
model. 
Total for time charges: 
11/3/98 Finance charge - reinstated 
Total amount of this bill 
Hours 
0.25 
1.00 
1.50 
0.50 
Amount 
3.25 $322.50 
$22.66 
$345.16 
Previous balance $390.00 
Craig Harris 
11/3/98 Payment - thank vou - Loren D. Martin, P.C. Ck #6498 
Balance due 
Page 2 
Amount 
($22.66) 
$712.50 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
MMK-Michelle M. Keller 
Hours 
1.75 
1.50 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, U T 84111 
Interest will be added at the rate of 18% per annum to all balances not oaid within 30 Have 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James KL Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 Wes t 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
December 4, 1998 
I n v o i c e # 9 8 1 1 0 2 6 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
11/3/98 M M K Entered personal and business tax return 
information for 1979 to 1989. 
11/4/98 M M K Created list of questions regarding business 
valuation to discuss with B. Townsend. 
Discussed valuation approaches with B. 
Townsend. 
RBT Reviewed work prepared by M. Keller. Generally 
reviewed documents provided by Ms. Harris. 
Me t with M. Keller to discuss analyses to be 
performed and information to obtain. 
11/5/98 M M K Analyzed tax returns in greater detail. Created 
list of question for Craig. 
11/6/98 M M K Discussed case status with B. Townsend. Called 
CPA. Bob Phelps asked for additional data. 
Noted case binder. 
RBT Met with M. Keller to review work performed 
on business valuation dates and additional work 
to be performed. 
11/9/98 M M K Reviewed information provided by Bonnie 
Harris' attorney (5+ binders). 
Hours 
3.00 
1.50 
1.00 
3.50 
0.50 
0.50 
3.50 
/7-&-V 
Craig Harris 
Hours 
11/10/98 MMK Continued reviewing documents provided by 
Bonnie's attorney. Updated asset schedule and 
list of questions for Craig Harris. 
11/16/98 MMK Reviewed information sent by AID's accountant. 
Entered B/S data for 1984 and 1985. 
5.00 
0.75 
RBT Met with M. Keller to receive update on work 
being performed. 
11/17/98 MMK Discussed case status with B. Townsend and 
allegations made by Bonnie per her attorney's 
letter. Called Margo Hiller-Polster for additional 
information and to schedule a meeting. 
RBT 
11/20/98 MMK 
Met with M. Keller to discuss findings in 
documents provided by Respondent. 
Spoke with Bonnie Harris' attorney about 
scheduling a meeting to understand client's 
concerns. Updated asset schedule to show 
10/31/97 credit card balances for Bonnie. 
Reviewed documents for relevant statements. 
Spoke with Craig Harris's attorney for update. 
Discussed admissibility of Defendant's 
documents with B. Townsend and Mark Nelson. 
0.25 
2.00 
0.75 
2.50 
RBT Reviewed documents provided by Ms. Harris 
and discussed with M. Keller. 
0.50 
11/24/98 MMK Grouped information provided by Ms. Harris' 
attorney. Called Ms. Hiller-Polster to confirm 
meeting and request additional information 
from Ms. Harris. 
0.50 
11/30/98 MMK Discussed case status and asset schedule with B. 
Townsend in preparation of afternoon meeting. 
Updated asset schedule and printed. Met with 
Bonnie Harris and Margo Hiller-Polster. Put 
6.50 
R-&^ 
Craig Harris 
11/30/98 RBT 
Hours 
Page 3 
together information needed for asset valuation. 
Spoke with AID's CPA Bob Phelps about data 
that he has. Updated asset schedule for new 
information provided by Bonnie. 
Reviewed documents sent by Margo 
Hiller-Polster in preparation for meeting with 
Bonnie and counsel. Met with Bonnie Harris 
and her counsel to discuss issues related to 
accounting and valuation of businesses. 
Conferenced with Craig Harris to discuss issues 
raised in meeting and process to proceed with 
investigation. Met with M. Keller to discuss 
issues raised in meeting and information 
currently available to analyze issues. 
6.00 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 38.25 S3,273.75 
Additional charges: 
11/30/98 Copying fees: 29 items 
Copying fees: 6 items 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
2.90 
0.60 
$3.50 
$3,277.25 
Previous balance 
11/18/98 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #30445 
Balance due 
$712.50 
($712.50) 
$3,277.25 
n-6>& 
Craig Harris 
Page 4 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 9.00 
MMK-Michelle M. KeUer 29.25 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James K. Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kellv R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
January 14, 1999 
Invoice # 9 8 1 2 0 3 1 
Re: Bonnie Hams vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
12/1/98 MMK Called Ms. Hiller-Polster regarding obtaining 
updated statements. 
12/2/98 RBT Conferenced with Mark Nelson regarding 
meeting with Respondant and her counsel. 
12/4/98 MMK Spoke with Bonnie about information we still 
need. Arranged meeting with B. Townsend. 
12/8/98 CBR Answered M. Keller's questions regarding 
business values on asset schedule. 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.25 
MMK Reviewed information sent by Bonnie Harris. 
Updated asset schedule. 
12/9/98 MMK Discussed case status with B. Townsend. We 
reviewed documents provided by Bonnie. 
Created schedules showing present value of 
proposed settlement. 
RBT Met with M. Keller regarding analysis. Met with 
Mark Nelson regarding scheduled meeting with 
Bonnie Harris. 
1.00 
2.75 
1.00 
Craig Harris 
Hours 
Page 2 
12/10/98 M M K 
RBT 
Called appraiser to get a ballpark estimate of 
growth on commercial property since 1986. 
Prepared copies for B. Townsend's meeting with 
B. Harris. Met with B. Townsend, Bonnie and 
Lisa to discuss proposed settlement. 
Met with Bonnie Harris to discuss components 
of asset schedule, values of various assets, and 
settlement proposals of the parties prepared to 
date. Met with M. Keller to discuss various 
assets and their values. 
4.00 
2.75 
12/11/98 M M K Discussed format of Bonnie's proposal with B. 
Townsend. Copied correspondence with Margo 
Hiller-Polster. Sent to Bonnie. Organized case 
documents. 
0.50 
12/22/98 M M K Created schedules showing Bonnie's proposed 
asset distribution for both Bonnie and Craig. 
Created new comparison schedule per B. 
Townsend. 
3.50 
RBT Met with M. Keller to review summaries of 
various settlement offers prepared at Bonnie's 
request. 
12/31/98 M M K Created asset schedule without using Bonnie 
Harris' information. Talked with Bonnie Harris 
about sending her NLA's analysis of Bonnie and 
Craig's settlement offer. 
0.75 
1.50 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 19.25 $1,666.25 
Additional charges: 
12/31/98 Phone charges: Nov/Dec 1.61 
Craig Harris 
Page 3 
Amount 
Total costs $1.61 
Total amount of this bill $1,667.86 
Previous balance $3,277.25 
12/16/98 Payment -thank you- Aid Equipment Company Ck #30576 ($3,277.25) 
Balance due $1,667.86 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 5.00 
CBR-Chortney B. Ruesch 0.25 
MMK-Michelle M. Keller 14.00 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111 
lames K. Loebbecke, CPA 
R. BradTownsend, CPA 
Kellv R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
February 8, 1999 
Invoice # 9 9 0 1 0 2 4 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
1/4/99 MMK Delivered updated asset schedule to Mark 
Nelson. Mailed settlement offer analysis to B. 
Harris. 
1/21/99 RBT 
1/22/99 RBT 
Met with Loren Martin and Mark Nelson 
regarding status of case and to discuss asset 
schedule prepared to date. 
Met with Mark Nelson to discuss specific 
aspects of asset schedule being questioned by 
Craig Harris and providing Mr. Nelson with 
documentation to support items on the asset 
schedule as currently listed in draft form. 
Hours 
0.25 
0.75 
1.00 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 2.00 $228.75 
Previous balance 
1/28/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Co. Ck #30796 
Balance due 
$1,667.86 
($1,667.86) 
$228\75 
Craig Harris 
Page 2 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Towns end 1.75 
MMK-Michelle M. Keller 0.25 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake Citv, "UT 84111 
iviemu i-^ . iNorman, <^r/\ 
James KL Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
KeUy R. Johnson, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
rnone ^ o u i p s y - i o u u 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy U T 84070 
March 11, 1999 
I n v o i c e # 9 9 0 2 0 3 3 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Crai* Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
2/1/99 RBT Reviewed order signed by Court regarding cut off 
on submission of information. Reviewed affidavit 
tha t Mark Nelson has requested we sign and 
made changes as necessary. Met briefly with 
Mark Nelson to discuss status of case and 
additional discovery to perform. 
2/23/99 RBT Began detailed review of asset schedule and 
determination of which documents may be relied 
upon pursuant to Court's order regarding 
discovery in the case. 
0.75 
2/24/99 RBT Continued review of asset schedule and 
supporting documentation. Conferenced with 
Mark Nelson regarding discovery legal issues as 
they relate to determination of the marital estate. 
2/25/99 RBT Continued preparation and revision of asset 
schedule based on information provided to date 
and in light of Court's order. 
2/26/99 RBT Completed asset schedule based on information 
available and pursuant to Court's order. Identified 
area where additional information is available 
through Bonnie Harris or through further 
2.25 
3.50 
3.25 
5.00 
FI-73 
Craig Harris 
discovery. Met with Mark Nelson to review 
documents available in their office that may fill 
gaps. Researched property values for 9400 South 
properties at Salt Lake County Assessor's office. 
Total for time charges: 
Hours 
Page 
Amount 
14.75 $1,770.00 
Previous balance 
2/17/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #30904 
Balance due 
$228.75 
($228.75) 
$1,770.00 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
Hours 
14.75 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake C i t v , U T 84111 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
3/1/99 RBT Met with Mark Nelson regarding valuation issues. 3.00 
Analyzed tax returns for period 1990 through 
1997. Continued refinement and adjustment of 
marital asset schedule. 
3/2/99 RBT Completed asset schedule based upon 9.50 
information currently available. Prepared 
valuation model schedules. Conferenced with Bob 
Phelps on accounting issues. Conferenced with 
Craig Harris regarding personal expenses and 
expensing of tools. Tied valuation information to 
tax returns for Corporation. Obtained comparable 
company information. Prepared income approach 
schedules for valuation. 
3/3/99 RBT Met with Mark Nelson to discuss valuation 5.50 
issues. Conferenced with Craig Harris regarding 
issues to resolve in valuation. Made additional 
adjustments to financial statements for valuation. 
Prepared letter to counsel and delivered draft 
reports to counsel for both parties. 
3/22/99 RBT Conferenced with Mark Nelson regarding points 0.50 
raised by Craig Harris with regard to valuation of 
assets. 
a ^ 7 <T 
James IC Loebbecke, CPA 
R. BradTownsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
April 5, 1999 
Invoice #9903030 
Craig Harris 
Total for time charges: 
Page 2 
Hours Amount 
18.50 $2,220.00 
Previous balance 
3/17/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #31037 
Balance due 
$1,770.00 
($1,770.00) 
$2,220.00 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
Hours 
18.50 
CC: Loren Mart in 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lalce City, U T 84111 
iviemil K. iNorman, i^rvi 
James IC Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Michelle Keller, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy U T 84070 
May 10, 1999 
I n v o i c e # 9 9 0 4 0 3 2 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing: is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
4/2/99 RBT Prepared revised schedules for counsel for both 
parties in anticipation of Monday's hearing. 
4/5/99 RBT Confer enced with Mark Nelson regarding marital 
asset schedule. Conferenced with Grant Moody 
regarding marital asset schedule. 
4/7/99 RBT Met with Grant Moody and Bonnie Harris to 
explain bases of information supporting various 
items on marital asset schedule. 
2.25 
1.00 
0.50 
Total for time charges: 
Amount 
3.75 $450.00 
Previous balance 
4/14/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company C k # 3 1 1 7 3 
Balance due 
$2,220.00 
($2,220.00) 
$450.00 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
Hours 
3.75 
/-7 n ^7 
Craig Harris 
Page 2 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James IC Loebbecke, CPA Fax (801)539-1642 
R. BradTownsend, CPA , o n ~ _ c . ~ . 
i^ii n T u PDA 139 East South Temple 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA ^ 
Michelle Keller, CPA ^ t e T ^ U ^ r _ 
ChortneyB.Ruesch _ „
 t t t A . Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Craig Harris June 14, 1999 
172 West 9400 South Invoice # 9 9 0 5 0 7 8 
Sandy UT 84070 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Amount 
Previous balance $450.00 
5/20/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Co. Ck #31333 ($450.00) 
Balance due $0.00 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111 
TntPrAQt wi l l VIA nrlrlprf at tho rata n f 1R<£ n o r <>n*i»m •«. « n u « i « . , « ^ „ « * ~ « : J , . 4 * U : _ i n J — 
Memll R. Norman, CPA 
James IC Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Chonney B. Ruesch 
Mark S. Schenk 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City U T 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
July 9, 1999 
Invoice # 9 9 0 6 0 3 5 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
6/28/99 RBT Reviewed Plaintiffs responses to Defendant's 
request for production as they related to 
accounting matters at request of Loren Martin. 
6/29/99 RBT Conferenced with Loren Martin regarding 
proposed content of possible affidavit regarding 
certain accounting issues. 
6/30/99 RBT Reviewed affidavit prepared by Plaintiffs counsel. 
Researched certain issues addressed in affidavit 
through review of accounting records. 
Conferenced with Mark Nelson regarding 
affidavit. 
0.50 
0.50 
1.80 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 2.80 $336.00 
Balance due $336.00 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 2.80 
/rl r^ r\ 
Craig Harris 
Page 2 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James K. Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
Mark S. Schenk 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
August 13, 1999 
Invoice # 9 9 0 7 0 4 4 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
7/26/99 RBT Reviewed information provided by both 
petitioner and respondent regarding various 
valuation issues. 
Total for time charges: 
0 
Hours ^ ^ 
1 . 0 0 y ' \ < ^ 
\*> 
Amount 
LOO $120.00 
Previous balance 
7/15/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #31596 
Balance due 
$336.00 
($336.00) 
$120.00 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
Hours 
1.00 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111 
iVierrui K*. iNorman, L I - A 
James K- Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
Mark S. Schenk 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
SandvUT 84070 
September 10, 1999 
Invoice #9908031 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
8/5/99 RBT Reviewed appraisal on residence attached to / 
commercial property. Conferenced with Grant * 
Moody. Conferenced with Mark Nelson, t^  
8/9/99 RBT Conferenced with Grant Moody regarding * 
documents provided. Conferenced with Loren . 
Martin and Craig Harris regarding ' 
documentation provided. 
8/10/99 CBR 
RBT 
Hours 
1.20^ 
1.00 / 
Teleconference with B. Townsend. Researched 
asset values. 
Updated marital estate schedule for new 
information obtained from both parties regarding 
valuation date of 1/26/99. Conferenced with 
Craig Harris. Conferenced with Loren Martin. \ \ <i 
Conferenced with Bonnie Harris. Reviewed new 1, ^ 
documents provided by Bonnie Harris.
 n y 
LOO/ 
8/11/99 RBT Updated valuation of AID Equipment for new ^ ^ 
valuation date and based upon 1998 year-end 
operations. Made adjustments to values of certain . 
assets based upon new information received from 
^ 0 0 / 
v f y 
ur*n 
c Craig Harris and Bonnie Harris. Sent updated \ 
drafts of asset schedules to attorneys to have on -* ^ 
hand for settlement conference scheduled for 8/12. • J W V 
M 
FT- A^ 
Craig Harris 
Hours 
Page 2 
8/12/99 RBT Conferenced with Loren Martin. Met with Craig 
Harris regarding line-of-credit documentation and 
LOO \s 
transactions. 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 12.70 $1,501.50 
Additional charges: 
8/5/99 Out-of-Pocket Expenses incurred: Salt Lake County Assessor's Office 1.00 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
$1.00 
$1,502.50 
Previous balance 
8/19/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Ck # 3 1 7 5 6 
Balance due 
$120.00 
($120.00) 
$1,502.50 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
CBR-Chortney B. Ruesch 
Hours 
12.20 
0.50 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
name 1 
ress 
trailer 
action 
e 
(ference to 
nding 
Precision 
bill 
charge 
payment 
ngement 
: HarrisBonCraig Nickname 2 
: Craig Harris 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
B Townsend 
B Townsend 
: Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
: None 
:No 
9/10/99 
9/24/99 
9/22/99 Amount 
Time Charges: From slips. 
Expenses: From slips. 
:60 
$1,502.50 
s/Slip# 
9/8/99 
£15683 
9/9/99 
#15684 
9/10/99 
#15685 
9/14/99 
#15686 
9/15/99 
#15687 
9/16/99 
#15688 
9/20/99 
#15689 
9/21/99 
#15690 
9/22/99 
#15691 
9/22/99 
#15969 
9/23/99 
#15692 
9/24/99 
#16143 
Description 
% 
B Townsend / Consultant fees 
Began review of trial tapes. Took notes on pertinent issues to address in valuations. Conferenced with 
Craig Harris and Loren Martin. * 
B Townsend / Consultant fees 
Continued review of trial tapes and noting of pertinent issues. 
B Townsend / Consultant fees 
Reviewed LOC records from Bank One. Conferenced with Debbie Schmidt of Bank One. 
B Townsend / Consultant fees '*)*** * \ 
Continued review of trial tapes and noting of pertinent issues. Conferenced with Bonnie Harris 
regarding possible additional information to be provided by Bank One. 
B Townsend / Consultant fees 
Completed review of trial tapes and identification of key issues to address in valuations. Conferenced 
with Loren Martin. 
B Townsend / Consultant fees • 
Conferenced with Loren Martin regarding asset schedules and Court's instructions regarding 
valuation dates. . JL 
HOURS/RATE 
4 . 0 0 ^ 
120.00 
1 . 6 0 ^ 
120.00 
0.60^ 
120.00 
AMOUNT 
480.00 
192.00 
72.00 
TOT£ 
v
*rt B Townsend / Consultant fees Collected information to prepare valuation schedules as of 8/9/95. Began^preparation of marital asset 
schedule as of 8/9/95. Conferenced with Grant Moody. Conferenced with Bonnie Harris. Reviewed 
documents provided by Bonnie Harris^L ^ 3 
B Townsend / Consultant fees ^
 m ^  
Reviewed documents provided by Bonnie Harris and assimilated into valuation schedules. Met with 
Mark Nelson regarding documents Bonnie Harris indicated had been provided by prior counsel. 
Prepared questions for Craig Harris to finalize schedules. Conferenced with Grant Moody. 
Conferenced with Craig Harris. Reviewed Signetics pension information. 
,<> 
B Townsend / Consultant fees/* *• * 
Finalized valuation schedules. Reviewed Bank One documents provided by Bonnie Harris.' 
Conferenced with Van Drimmelen's office. Researched possible subdivision of Sandy property. -^ 
Prepared for trial. Conferenced with Craig Harris. (Estimate) 
t$ > 
A Shumway / Intern Fees 
Found all invoice billings and made copies. Created spreadsheet with billing totals and payments. 
B Townsend / Consultant fees 
Attended trial and delivered testimony. 
B Townsend / Consultant fees 
Conferenced with Loren Martin regarding court's rulings and division of assets. 
3 . 7 0 ^ 
120.00 
1.80*/ 
120.00 
0.60 
120.00 
</ 
4.70*^ 
120.00 
5 . 0 0 ^ 
120.00 
7 . 5 0 ^ 
120.00 
9.50 
120.00 
0.50 
120.00 
444.00 
216.00 
72.00 
564.00 
600.00 
900.00 
67.50 
1,140.00 
60.00 
TAL BILLABLE TIME CHARGES 41.00 $4,807. 
t^r n J^ 
w.^iit uniiiiy wuri^sneei 
HarnsBonCraig 
Date/Slip# 
9/21/99 
#16106 
:Craig Harris (continued) 
Description 
Line Item Costs / $Copies 
Copying charges: 132 items 
QTY/PRiCE 
132 
0.10 
13.20 
TOTAL BiLLABLE COSTS 
TOTAL NEW CHARGES 
PREVIOUS BALANCE 
Current period 
$4,8 
1,502.50 
TOTAL PREVIOUS BALANCE 
PAYMENTS/REFUNDS/CREDITS 
9/22/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #31957 
$1,5 
(1,502.50) 
TOTAL PAYMENTS/REFUNDS/CREDITS 
NEW BALANCE 
New Current period 
($1.51 
4,820.70 
TOTAL NEW BALANCE 
Consultant Summary 
B Townsend / 21 
<\ Shumway / 31 
3ILL MESSAGES 
$4,a 
Rate 
120.00 
45.00 
Unbill 
Hours 
Unbill 
Amount 
Billable 
Hours 
39.50 
1.50 
Bi 
An 
$4,7' 
$e 
3ill Message 1: 
DC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
FT-ft(o 
Merrill K. Norman, CPA 
lames IC Loebbecke, CPA 
R. Brad Townsend, CPA 
KeUy R. Johnson, CPA 
Chortncy B. Ruesch 
Mark S. Schenk 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City U T 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 Wes t 9400 South 
Sandv UT 84070 
October 13, 1999 
I n v o i c e # 9 9 0 9 0 0 9 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for sendees rendered in the above mentioned case. 
Hours 
9/8/99 RBT Began review of trial tapes. Took notes on 
pertinent issues to address in valuations. 
Conferenced with Craig Harris and Loren Martin. 
9/9/99 RBT Continued review of trial tapes and not ing of 
pertinent issues. 
9/10/99 RBT Reviewed LOC records from Bank One. 
Conferenced with Debbie Schmidt of Bank One. 
4.00 
1.60 
0.60 
9/14/99 RBT 
9/15/99 RBT 
Continued review of trial tapes and noting of 
pertinent issues. Conferenced with Bonnie Harris 
regarding possible additional information to be 
provided by Bank One. 
Completed review of trial tapes and identification 
of key issues to address in valuations. 
Conferenced with Loren Martin. 
3.70 
1.80 
9/16/99 RBT Conferenced with Loren Martin regarding asset 
schedules and Court's instructions regarding 
valuation dates. 
0.60 
9/20/99 RBT Collected information to prepare valuation 
schedules as of 8/9/95. Began preparation of 
marital asset schedule as of 8/9/95. Conferenced 
with Grant Moody. Conferenced with Bonnie 
Harris. Reviewed documents provided by Bonnie 
4.70 
h 
* \ / > 
Craig Harris 
Harris. 
Page 2 
Hours 
9/21/99 RBT Reviewed documents provided by Bonnie Harris 
and assimilated into valuation schedules. Met 
with Mark Nelson regarding documents Bonnie 
Harris indicated had been provided by prior 
counsel. Prepared questions for Craig Harris to 
finalize schedules. Conferenced with Grant 
Moody. Conferenced with Craig Harris. Reviewed 
Signetics pension information. 
9/22/99 RBT Finalized valuation schedules. Reviewed Bank 
One docucments provided by Bonnie Harris. 
Conferenced with Van Drimmelen's office. 
Researched possible subdivision of Sandy 
property. Prepared for trial. Conferenced with 
Craig Harris. 
AS Found all invoice billings and made copies. 
Created spreadsheet with billing totals and 
payments. 
9/23/99 RBT Attended trial and delivered testimony. 
9/24/99 RBT Conferenced with Loren Martin regarding court's 
rulings and division of assets. 
5.00 
7.50 
1.50 
9.50 
0.50 
Amoun t 
Total for time charges: 41.00 54,807.50 
Additional charges: 
9/21/99 Copying charges: 132 items 13.20 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
S13.20 
$4,820.70 
Previous balance $1,502.50 
Craig Harris 
•X /V 
9/22/99 Payment - thank you - Aid Equipment Company Ck #31957 
Balance due 
Page 3 
Amount 
($1,502.50) 
$4,820.70 
Consultant summary 
Consultant 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 
AS-Amy Shumway 
Hours 
39.50 
1.50 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake Citv, U T 84111 
Merrill R. Norman, CPA 
James K. Loebbccke. CPA 
R. BradTownsend, CPA 
Kelly R. Johnson, CPA 
Chortney B. Ruesch 
MarkS. Schenk 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates 
Phone (801)539-1600 
Fax (801)539-1642 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Craig Harris 
172 Wes t 9400 South 
Sandy UT 84070 
November 5, 1999 
Invoice #9910031 
Re: Bonnie Harris vs. Craig Harris 
This billing is for services rendered in the above mentioned case. 
10/1/99 RBT Met with Craig Harris and Loren Mart in to 
discuss Court's rulings and begin preparation of 
proposed property division. 
10/7/99 CBR Teleconference with B. Townsend. Edited 
scenarios per B. Towns end's instructions. 
RBT Prepared draft of proposed asset distribution 
schedule. 
10/8/99 RBT 
10/9/99 RBT 
10/11/99 RBT 
Conferenced with Craig Harris regarding asset 
schedule. Conferenced with Grant Moody 
regarding asset schedule. 
Conferenced with Bonnie Harris regarding asset 
schedule. 
Prepared draft of Bonnie Harris proposed 
distribution based upon information provided by 
Grant Moody. Conferenced with Grant Moody. 
Conferenced with Craig Harris. Conferenced with 
Loren Martin. Made adjustments to both 
proposed distribution schedules based upon input 
from Bonnie and her counsel, and Craig and his 
counsel. Reviewed video tape of Court's rulings 
regarding various assets and pre-marital property. 
Hours 
2.10 
0.50 
1.50 
LOO 
0.70 
8.50 
f 
Craig Harris X ^ / N ^ / 
Page 2 
Hours 
10/12/99 RBT Prepared final versions of proposed distributions 7.00 
and prepared copies for Court. Summarized 
interest payments on Kne of credit for period 1/99 
through 8/99. Summarized NLA time charges for 
consideration by Court. Attended trial and 
provided testimony. 
Amount 
Total for time charges: 21.30 $2,533.50 
Previous balance $4,820.70 
Balance due $7,354.20 
Consultant summary 
Consultant Hours 
RBT-R. Brad Townsend 20.80 
CBR-Chortney B. Ruesch 0.50 
CC: Loren Martin 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
